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ABSTRACT
After an early career in accountancy, corporate management and consulting in England, 
Bermuda and Canada an opportunity presented itself to embark on a new career in 
international development consultancy.  A series of public finance reform assignments 
in the Caribbean, South America, Eastern Europe, South East Asia and Southern Africa 
provided the foundation for my work in the Republic of Kosovo which is the source of 
the public works that are submitted with this paper.
Over a period of four years I was engaged in three projects to introduce the European
Union’s Public Internal Financial Control financial governance model to Kosovo, a poor, 
corrupt new country hoping to gain admittance to the EU.  This work involved applying 
international best practices to developing financial management policy, laws and 
regulations supported by strategic plans, multi-level capacity building initiatives and a 
change management strategy to drive future interventions.  Taken together these 
projects represent a uniquely integrated intervention that touched all levels of 
government and has been independently evaluated as having had considerable positive 
impact on the development of Kosovo.
Despite the positive outcomes, an examination of the limitations of the best practices 
model encountered in my work and in the observations of various professional and 
academic commentators, suggests a more effective way forward: developing country-
specific, principles-based interventions rather than imposing western normative models, 
with the involvement of a broader set of actors that includes civil society and informal 
actors. 
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INTRODUCTION
This Context Statement presents a body of work to support my candidacy for a 
Doctorate in Professional Studies based on public works that were produced over four 
years between 2007 and 2011 relating to the implementation of Public Internal Financial 
Control in the Government of the Republic of Kosovo.  The context is presented in five 
sections with the works themselves, which are listed in Annex 1, being presented 
separately.
The first section presents my professional background in accountancy and consulting, 
highlighting the significance of on-the-job learning and formal training to my 
professional development.  The next section explains my entry into international 
development consultancy, which provided the platform for the public works that I am 
presenting.
The third section presents my experiences over four years during which I was engaged in 
three projects to introduce the European Union’s financial governance model (called 
Public Internal Financial Control) to Kosovo, a poor, corrupt new country hoping to gain 
admittance to the EU.  This section introduces each of the public works I have 
submitted.
The impact of this work in developing financial management policy, laws and regulations 
supported by strategic plans, multi-level capacity building and a change management 
strategy to drive future interventions is then evaluated in Section four to demonstrate 
its value to Kosovo, to the European Union, to the profession and to my ongoing 
development.
The final section discusses how my recent experience has led me to re-consider current 
development practices and presents ideas from academic sources that I would like to 
promote in practice as I enter the next phase of my career.  In particular these suggest 
(a) a new approach based on using non-negotiable principles to develop country-specific 
solutions, rather than the present practice of imposing western normative models, and 
(b) involving a broader set of actors that includes civil society and informal actors. 
Many thanks to Dr. Peter Critten for his invaluable guidance and encouragement 
throughout the preparation of this document and to Dr. Richard Jones for his thorough 
review of my final draft, and to both for their suggestions for improvements.
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1. PROFESSIONAL FOUNDATIONS 1977-2001 
After leaving grammar school in 1974 I decided on a career in accountancy on the basis 
that a profession that was not tied to any particular industry would give me 
geographical mobility. This proved to be a good decision and after finishing college in 
Derby I progressed well in my first jobs as Management Accountant in York, England 
from 1977 to 1981 and in Bermuda from 1981 to 1984.  
The professional training that started me off in the working world shaped my values 
with its emphasis on professional competence and integrity. The seven years I spent 
working as a management accountant provided me with the financial skills that would 
underpin the rest of my career, and my experience in Bermuda gave me my first taste of 
working overseas, broadening my horizons significantly. 
After a few years I became restless with the repetitive accounting cycle so in 1984 I 
decided to try a new professional direction.  Having travelled to various places in 
eastern Canada and the USA I thought I would try my luck over there.
Feeling that management consultancy would give me the variety of a project-based 
environment I joined The Laurier Group,a small consultancy start-up in Ottawa, Canada, 
as a junior consultant.  I had assumed that consultancy would involve similar work to 
management accountancy, advising businesses on profit-maximising strategies.  
However, this turned out not to be the case, since, being based in Canada’s capital, most 
of our work involved reforms in the Federal government.
Entering this new field, I had to learn the methodology and lexicon of consultancy, and 
also how to deal with a totally new class of problems, throwing away private sector 
models and learning the context of big government.  (For example: money saved in the 
private sector goes straight to the bottom line and is a positive event; in the public 
sector money left unspent is a major failure).  My value to the firm was in the financial 
systems experience I had gained as an accountant, since this was a period of first-time 
automation of systems across government.  However I had little exposure to the then-
current system analysis techniques, so after reading Gane and Sarsen’s book1 on 
functional decomposition I took some courses and earned a Certified Systems 
Professional (CSP) designation from the Chicago-based Institute for the Certification of 
Computer Professionals.  This was a poor substitute for the computer science degrees 
that most of my colleagues had but gave me enough understanding of the system 
development life cycle and contemporary issues in automation to hold my own.
                                                          
1C. Gane and T. Sarsen, 1978 Structured System Analysis: Tools and Techniques, McDonnell Douglas Information, USA
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The three partners in The Laurier Group (John Harris, Ed Smith and Martin Lax) were 
unselfish with their time and advice, helping me to develop as a consultant and 
encouraging me through rapid promotions to Senior Consultant, Project Manager and 
eventually Principal Consultant.  It was an exciting time as the business was expanding 
fuelled by the wave of reforms sweeping the public sector, and I enjoyed the sense of 
accomplishment that came with being an integral part of this success.  It seemed likely 
that I would remain in Canada for some time, so I enrolled in the Canadian Association 
of Certified General Accountants’ training programme and after a couple of years 
emerged with the Certified General Accountant (CGA) designation.   
In due course The Laurier Group was acquired by Deloitte and Touche Management 
Consultants bringing access to bigger, higher profile assignments, and better 
professional development and career opportunities.  Through Deloittes I received 
formal training in Professional Selling and Developing Strategic Plans, and attended 
many informal learning sessions on a variety of topical issues.  I felt very fortunate to be 
part of such a quality firm.  However, Deloittes was very structured and a far cry from 
the ad-hoc, laissez-faire atmosphere that prevailed in the smaller firm so I was receptive 
when a new challenge in a small organisation came along.  It followed an assignment I 
had done for the Comptroller General of Canada evaluating all the financial 
management systems then in use in the Canadian government.  I had been impressed 
by a new product from a small consulting firm called Linktek Corporation and they liked 
me from my work in the review process.  When they approached me to join them as 
General Manager to help them transition to focusing on implementing financial systems 
in the federal government, I was excited by the idea of building a business more or less 
from the beginning.
As a result, 1989 found me once again in a small organisation, competing with large US 
software firms with only a small team and the money we could generate from sales.  
This meant hands-on involvement in most aspects of the business from developing 
marketing plans and sales campaigns to building and running a sales team, a group of
functional and technical implementation specialists, and a training centre. 
To expand my understanding of the federal government financial management 
environment and establish myself in the community that was my market, I joined the 
Financial Management Institute of Canada (FMI), which represented them.  This led to 
my serving two years on the Board of the Capital Chapter, with responsibility for 
developing a new sponsorship programme.  The FMI has prospered and grown over the 
years and I remain a member in good standing.
Page 7 of 85
Over the following years we captured around a third of the Canadian government 
market and expanded into the US; a significant achievement for a small privately-held 
organisation.  I thrived on the excitement of building an entrepreneurial business, 
implementing internal processes to support our growth, and managing ever-larger 
projects.  I matured as a manager, directing various functional teams and, once we 
became big enough to need one, serving on the senior management committee.  Kevin 
Higgins, one of the two founders of Linktek was a big influence during this time, giving 
me free rein to manage my business and eventually promoting me to be the company’s 
first non-founding Vice-President. 
One of the constraints facing small organisations is the limited resources for staff 
development, especially at the management level.  My early days at Linktek were 
characterised by a mix of trial and error and reading contemporary business books.  
Four key books I remember well are “Guerrilla Marketing” 2,  “Marketing Warfare” and 
“Bottom-up Marketing”3 which showed how to build market share without a 
sophisticated marketing operation, and “Reinventing Government”4 which promoted a 
philosophy of doing government better with which we wanted to associate ourselves.
To match my increasing responsibilities with a more integrated skill set I enrolled in the 
MBA programme at the University of Ottawa.  About half way through the programme 
extensive business travel made it impossible for me to continue attending classes.  At 
the time, the CGA was promoting the Edinburgh Business School distance learning MBA 
programme at Heriot-Watt University so I enrolled, transferring some credits and 
graduating a couple of years later.  
After about eight years with FreeBalance I was getting stale. The software business in 
Ottawa was booming and I took advantage of offers of executive positions with two 
other local software firms between 1997 and 2001.  
The first was Jetform Inc., a local software success story that is now part of the global 
Adobe Systems organisation.  My mission was to start a new division to develop 
automated workflow-based administrative systems for large organisations in the public 
sector (including Statistics Canada and NASA Jet Propulsion Systems) and the private 
                                                          
2Levinson, Jay Conrad, 1983, Guerrilla Marketing, Houghton Mifflin, USA
3Ries, A and Trout, J., 1986, Marketing Warfare, Penguin Books Ltd., Harmondsworth, UK
and Ries, A and Trout, J., 1989, Bottom-up Marketing, Penguin Books Ltd., Harmondsworth, UK
4 Osborne, D. & Gaebler, T., 1993, Penguin Group, USA
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sector (such as Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum and Prudential Insurance).  For this I 
needed a technical understanding of workflow automation, so in addition to in-house 
seminars, two books helped me understand this new, technology-enabled approach to 
business process reengineering: Fischer’s “New Tools for the Times: the Workflow 
Paradigm”5 and Koulopolous’ “The workflow imperative: building real world business 
solutions”6.
After two years with Jetform, I was approached by a former colleague to join a rapidly-
growing software company, Eftia OSS Solutions Inc., to head up the new Professional 
Services Division, and I was once again thrust into the entrepreneurial chaos that comes 
with exponential growth.  
At Eftia I was responsible for building a consulting division to deliver high-value systems 
to support the new telephone companies that emerged after deregulation. Although my 
responsibilities remained in familiar project management territory, the telecom industry 
was completely new to me.  This was a challenge, especially as I was supervising 
technical specialists with extensive experience in publicly-owned phone systems,o I 
attended classes to acquire a new technical base, this time in telecommunications 
technology (packet switching and so forth)7, and to hone my leadership skills.8
Our business did extremely well, very quickly.  At one point the board turned down an 
offer of half a billion dollars from a major multinational but sadly hubris, immature 
products and the sudden collapse of the telecom market saw the company dissolve into 
oblivion (see The Ottawa Citizen, January 10, 2006 “The long slow demise of Eftia OSS 
Solutions”9).  The rapid growth and subsequent failure of the company provided many 
learning opportunities, both on the way up and the way down.
An important client in my earlier days at Linktek Corporation had been Bruce Lazenby 
from the Canadian Department of National Defence.   Once Linktek was established in 
the Canadian market, I was assigned to lead the company’s expansion into the American 
                                                          
5 Fischer L. editor, 1995, New Tools for the Times: the Workflow Paradigm, Second Edition, Future 
Strategies Inc., Lighthouse Point FL, USA
6 Koulopolous, Thomas M, 1995, The workflow imperative: building real world business solutions, Van 
Nostrand Reinhold, New York, NY, USA
7Telecom Fundamentals I and II, rev 2.1 1998, Global Knowledge Network, Cary, SC, USA
8 Gordon, Thomas, 1977, Leader Effectiveness Training, L.E.T., Wyden Books, New York, NY, USA
9Available at http://www.canada.com/story_print.html?id=3a80ff58-f6cb-4828-a710-4a7a2d8e367d
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state and municipal sector and Bruce was persuaded to leave the military to take over 
my operation.  Subsequently Bruce’s natural leadership won him the CEO role.  He was 
always very generous in giving me credit for leaving him with a solid organisation, and as 
Eftia was beginning to wind down he recruited me back to sort out some issues in the 
professional services team.  I was happy to work with him again, hoping to absorb some 
of his leadership qualities. 
While contributing to Linktek (now renamed “FreeBalance Inc.” after its product line) a 
second time was interesting in itself, one particular task was negotiating contracts to 
supply Treasury systems to Kosovo to help with its reconstruction after the 1998/99 
conflict with Serbia and to Timor Leste after its own internal conflict.  As our first foray 
beyond North America this was a complete departure from our normal business and the 
opening of a new and still fruitful market for FreeBalance.  It was later to prove pivotal 
in opening a new career direction for me.  
By early 2001, the software industry had contracted following the “dot com” crash and I 
wasn’t enjoying the more technical IT content of my recent work so I decided to return 
to management consultancy where I could concentrate on work which I found more 
interesting.  On reviewing the options I was pleased to discover a segment of the 
consultancy profession that focuses on projects in the developing world, providing the 
opportunity to combine work with international travel.  Happily, financial management, 
which is my core skill, is a significant focus of technical aid to the developing world.  As 
the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) blog notes: 
“Countries with low standards of living need … better and more efficient systems to 
keep track of the money that flows into their exchequers.  This is to ensure value-for-
money for their population.  Well-trained public sector accountants and improved 
financial management systems can ensure effective administration of public money and 
aid”10.  
This looked like an interesting opportunity to apply my financial management skills 
along the road less travelled.   Although my CV didn’t reflect a traditional aid 
background, my qualifications and experience managing consulting organisations, 
coupled with my limited exposure to developing countries through my work in 
Bermuda, Timor Leste and Kosovo, was enough to secure a position with Cowater 
International, a well-established Canadian international development consulting firm.  
With this, an exciting new chapter in my personal and professional life was opened.
                                                          
10 Mawhood, Caroline 2011 Aid, adversity and accountants, posted in CIPFA Public Finance blog, 14 March 
2011
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Looking back at this period I was very lucky to work with some wonderful people and 
dynamic companies, to be involved in a range of business activities and to be presented 
with a constant flow of new learning opportunities which prepared me for the next, very 
exciting chapter in my career.  
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2. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANCY 2001- 2007
The move into development consultancy as Vice-President of the Cowater 
Accountability Group found me with responsibility for a number of projects in the South 
East Asia and Asia Pacific regions.  Two in particular were important in establishing my 
development credentials, positioning me for my later work in Kosovo which is the 
source of the public works that I am presenting with this paper.
The first of these two projects was to modernise the Bangladesh Ministry of Water 
Resources’ financial management capability.  This project was a good fit with my 
background, refreshing my earlier connection with internal audit.  Its objective was to 
improve financial decision-making and accountability for financial resources, while 
removing opportunities for corruption and rent-seeking by government officials.  This 
experience opened my eyes to the extent of corruption that exists in developing 
countries.  For example, one of my objectives was to streamline and automate the 
process that cleared employees to receive their retirement benefits, thereby 
disintermediating the officials who used their position to demand unauthorised fees to 
expedite the necessary approvals.  
I also discovered that, unlike my clients in North America, the beneficiaries I was 
supposed to be helping did not necessarily welcome the well-meaning interference of 
foreign consultants.  It was humbling to discover that, far from being considered a 
valued source of useful wisdom, we are often a nuisance to be tolerated as the price of 
aid packages from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank and for the 
personal benefits we can provide.  I was surprised by the fractious relationship between 
the beneficiary and my local project team, although I discovered this is not unusual in 
development work since donor and beneficiary (especially at the working level) may 
have different agendas that the consultant has to somehow reconcile, often to no-one’s 
complete satisfaction.  I learnt to use discretionary funds at my disposal to dispense 
developmental “gifts” that, while legitimate development expenditures, provided 
encouragement to local counterparts to collaborate with us.  For example, personal 
computers and air conditioners are desirable status symbols, and “study tours” to 
foreign institutions provide a welcome opportunity for travel abroad and, more 
importantly, hard currency in the form of daily expense allowances.
As a newcomer to the development business it seemed that reverence for age and 
precedent hindered the innovation needed to progress.  Not the kind of innovation that 
requires major technology breakthroughs, though: much of Cowater’s work involved 
simple initiatives like bringing water to villages, and digging holes for toilets.  These 
projects were not beyond local capability, just beyond their imagination.  This is 
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compounded by an approach to problems that focuses on finding and punishing a guilty 
party, as opposed to a western “engineering” approach which looks for causes so 
problems can be rectified and avoided.  This started me thinking beyond the technical 
methods that I was hired to dispense, to consider what causes poverty, and the 
effectiveness of development aid.
There are different perspectives on this issue, and probably the reasons are as complex 
and diverse as human societies. Around this time, Jared Diamond’s book, Guns, Germs 
and Steel: the Fates of Human Societies11 was popular (although not new).  He argues 
that environmental differences enable the development of gaps in power and 
technology which create self-sustaining advantages, with his main point being that 
wealth and power are the result of opportunity and necessity and not any special 
genetic endowments.  His book is of limited relevance to more recent history (say the 
last 2-300 years) and he seems to dismiss ingenuity as a source of advancement, but 
provides much food for thought.  
The other assignment that helped establish me as a development consultant was a 
World Bank project to introduce modern audit techniques in the Office of the Auditor 
General of Pakistan in Islamabad (as conditionality for substantial financial assistance).   
This project had been underway for about a year before my arrival, during which the 
consulting team had consumed the majority of the project budget developing outputs 
that the beneficiary wouldn’t accept.  Upon investigation, it became clear that the 
consultants, previously auditors in the Canadian Audit Office, had been delivering 
material that reflected good Canadian practice but which the Auditor General of 
Pakistan could not apply in the local environment.  This introduced me to the limitations 
of exporting so-called “best practices” from the West into dissimilar environments, and 
the futility of trying to force-fit culturally inappropriate solutions.
I needed to ensure our outputs would be accepted so that Cowater would receive 
much-needed revenues (about a million dollars was outstanding).  The fact that much of 
the budget had been spent was a complicating factor, and I had no option but to get 
personally involved, despite having no background in Supreme Audit Institutions12.
The support of two colleagues who had relevant expertise and an excellent local 
counterpart, Dr. Akmal Minallah, were essential to re-developing the project outputs to 
the satisfaction of the Auditor General.  Dr. Akmal in particular was critical to the 
                                                          
11Diamond, J.  1997, Guns, Germs and Steel: the Fates of Human Societies, Norton, USA
12The generic title for national audit offices.
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success of this project, being highly motivated and sufficiently senior to get things done: 
the prototypical change agent.  He also made sure I understood the local “ground 
realities”.  
Shuttling back and forth to Ottawa, I benefited greatly from the counsel of Dr. Mike 
McGarry at Cowater.  Mike had lived in Pakistan, in a remote rural area, working on a 
programme to introduce education for females. He and his family had left following 
death threats in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Now, in 2003, things seemed calmer, 
especially in the capital, and he provided valuable contacts that made my life a lot 
easier.
Taking an ACCA course to earn a Certificate in International Auditing also helped to 
update my knowledge of modern audit standards, which had evolved over the 25 years 
since I had last had any audit training.  
On a personal level, I thoroughly enjoyed my two years in and out of Pakistan.  A high 
point was bringing my wife out for a visit at the end of the project, to tour the 
picturesque Swat valley (sadly, subsequently devastated by an earthquake) to the 
Karakorum Mountains, followed by a trip up the Khyber Pass.   Dr. Akmal had used his 
contacts in the military to arrange an armed escort through the North West Frontier 
Province and up the historic Khyber Pass all the way to the border with Afghanistan.  
Passing into the tribal areas where the government has no authority and foreigners are 
not allowed was quite a thrill, as was our visit to bazaars where you could buy anything 
from stolen US Army supplies to machine guns and RPGs13.  With hindsight, this trip may 
not have been well-advised, but it was a view of life on the Pak-Afghan border that not 
many westerners will get.  
Because I was new to the international development business I had to develop a new 
network.  The local chapter of the Rome-based Society for International Development 
(SID) was very helpful in this.  It was going through a period of renewal so I had an 
opportunity to join its new Board, contributing to its strategic plan and helping to 
implement its lecture programme, providing me with additional contacts and insight 
into development issues.
In the course of my networking, I came into contact with Dr. Jim Armstrong, President of 
The Governance Network.  My experience with the development world was that 
development consultants are hired and paid by donors as “experts” to come with the 
solutions ready in the guise of “best practice”.  However, western best practice is not 
                                                          
13Rocket propelled grenades
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always a good fit in other environments as I had discovered in my recent experience 
with “ground realities” in Pakistan.  Jim had a more considered approach to 
development, looking for opportunities to apply a holistic approach incorporating real 
local collaboration to generate sustainable results rather than focusing on narrow 
project objectives.  This resonated with me after my experience in Pakistan and we had 
many conversations exploring the conceptual and practical implications for 
development work.
Jim’s perspective is neatly summarised in an article he contributed to Canadian 
Government Executive magazine14.  In it, he notes that the majority of global public 
administration reform projects fall short of their objectives and fail to sustain benefits 
after the project is complete, blaming the approach of transplanting best practice in 
foreign soil.  He suggests that different donor nations have their own views as to what 
constitutes best practice, and also that the passive importation of foreign practices 
prevents development of indigenous solutions.  
Partly this is the result of the ethnocentrism of the donors and their experts, with our 
appreciation of other cultures being limited by our established mental frames, so we 
push best practices without paying attention to local values, history or context.  
Cosmetic modifications might be made but we don’t try to build on a country’s 
strengths, respect its traditions or allow the autonomy to grow smart leaders and 
organisations.
He notes that foreign “best practices rarely improve the relationship between governors 
and governed”, and promote a simplistic technical view of very complex problems which 
really require “involvement of whole systems and engagement of a full range of 
stakeholders”.  Instead he believes that technical interventions must be accompanied by 
engagement at the political, stakeholder and citizen level and by cultural change in 
order to be successful and self-sustaining, involving honest collaboration between 
“participants who share a purpose, goals and action strategies and respects and builds 
upon the unique strengths of the indigenous context, condition, history and values”.
This issue continues to preoccupy me.  In my field experts are often retired public 
servants, arriving in a new country equipped with 20 or 25 years of experience as, say, 
an auditor or budget manager.  The problem is that this type of background is often less 
                                                          
14 Armstrong, Jim, 2010, From best to smart practice: a global perspective, Canadian Government Executive, February
2010, Volume 16, no. 2, Ottawa
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20 years’ experience as much as it is one year’s experience repeated 20 times.  Worse is 
when the expert’s experience is all gained in a single ministry.  In which case not only do 
they only know one set of practices, but they only know them as implemented in one 
organisation in one country.  This sort of one-dimensional experience is an inadequate 
preparation for work in countries with very different historical, cultural and educational 
contexts.
I developed some differences with Cowater’s president so after completing the projects 
to everyone’s satisfaction, I decided to move on.   Happily Dr. Armstrong invited me to 
join his team in 2005/6 to work on two transformative projects in the Caribbean 
(Suriname and Trinidad & Tobago) that had been designed to apply the collaborative 
approach he had described to me.
The first of these was a Study of Issues and Policy Options for Public Sector Reform for 
the Government of the Republic of Trinidad & Tobago.  This was a true government-
wide initiative to develop a strategy to enable the Government of Trinidad & Tobago to 
achieve its ambitious development goals.  Because of my financial management 
background I was appointed to lead the component concerned with the institutional 
framework for governance and accountability.  This was a welcome opportunity to apply 
my skills in the context of a new approach and gain exposure to some new public sector 
governance issues. 
In Suriname I worked with Dr. Armstrong on a “Roadmap for a Public Sector Reform 
Programme” to achieve national development objectives and improve public sector 
performance and accountability.  This work, which was championed by the Ministry of 
Finance, included reviewing the capacity of nine major government ministries, working 
with stakeholders to map programmes with policy objectives, and articulating a strategy 
for rationalizing government operations.  Important for me was experiencing at first 
hand Dr. Armstrong’s approach to building collaboration through workshops with 
ministers, elected officials and leaders from the private sector and civil society which he 
applied to developing a shared national vision, defining the values and principles that 
should guide reform and identifying indicators to monitor government’s execution of 
the reform strategy.
Jim has been a huge influence on how I understand and try to practice public sector 
reform in a development context, and I adopt his collaborative techniques in my work 
where possible.  Unfortunately, demand for this type of national-level strategic reform is 
limited so I had to look for new horizons.  My next opportunity came from an 
unexpected direction: Europe.  The break-up of Yugoslavia at the end of the twentieth 
century had created a set of newly independent states needing post-war reconstruction, 
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including the establishment of modern public administrations, and which were anxious 
to take the steps necessary to join the European Union.  This, together with the 
dissolution of the USSR, created a surge of demand for international development 
consultants in all sectors and I found myself involved in the work of rebuilding 
transitional (i.e. post-communist) and post-conflict states.
My early work in this field was a series of missions to Sarajevo in post-conflict Bosnia & 
Herzegovina (Bosnia), one of the breakaway states from Yugoslavia.  En route I delivered 
a couple of seminars on public sector financial management and auditing principles for a 
Vienna-based development consultancy that was positioning itself for governance 
assignments in south and east Europe.  
The assignment in Bosnia (which commenced in early 2007) provided a number of 
learning opportunities.  The matter at hand was not the familiar reporting of financial 
data from an accounting system, but rather obtaining macro-economic information 
from different state actors to feed the statistical system that supported fiscal decision-
making, especially the thorny issue of determining what share of indirect tax revenues 
each state actor gets.  Complications arose due to the extraordinary constitutional 
framework in Bosnia, which although legally a single country, operates through multiple 
distinct, mutually distrusting governments at federal, entity, canton and municipality 
levels.  Each layer in this complicated scenario has its own fiscal authority and jealously 
guards its autonomy to ensure that its own interests are not undermined.
The technical challenge of this assignment was nothing compared to manoeuvring 
around the open distrust between these layers of government.  With no education in 
comparative politics it was only from living in different countries that I had any notion of 
the different constitutional bases for unitary and federal governments.  Being dropped 
into one of the most complex and problematic political environments (a legacy of the 
Dayton accord that froze the tragic ethnic violence in this part of Yugoslavia) was a 
massive new learning.  
There was also an opportunity to learn something of the history of Yugoslavia and 
especially the conflict between the Serbs and the Bosniaks, and later the Croats, which 
led to the current situation.  Spending time with a local historian who guided my wife 
and me to various sites around Sarajevo that had played a role in the siege of Sarajevo 
was instructive.  (I repaid him by editing his English-language marketing material).  It 
was incredible to consider a brutal siege occurring in modern times in the middle of 
continental Europe, but the pock marks left by artillery shrapnel on many buildings in 
the town centre were clear evidence of the violence perpetrated against a defenceless 
population.  I became interested in learning more about the Balkans and its history, 
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which I pursued in part by taking a correspondence course on Peacekeeping in the 
Former Yugoslavia15 provided by the UN.  Noel Malcolm’s Kosovo: A Short History16, 
despite lacking shortness at 492 pages, was a helpful primer on another troubled part of 
ex-Yugoslavia.
Before looking at the specific works presented with this paper, this is a good point to 
reflect on my career trajectory.  My start in accountancy and subsequent career in 
management consultancy/professional services prepared me well for the international 
development work I do now, through: 
 a technical focus on financial and administrative management;
 a commitment to learning and integrity;
 reforming public sector clients;
 the strategic nature of the assignments;
 a strong international dimension; 
 developing “situational fluency” to adjust to different circumstances; and
 implementing transformational change.  
Although I have always worked in the private sector, circumstances involved me working 
mostly with public sector clients.  This accidental focus has given me a strong 
appreciation for the broad and diverse role that the public sector has in society and its 
profound influence on the quality of citizens’ lives.  Development consultancy provides 
the chance to apply my experience to improving the effectiveness of government 
organisations in the developing world where the impact of even modest improvements 
can be substantial. 
There is also an opportunity to have a positive impact on an individual level.  One way is 
to demonstrate by example effective work habits.  These are basic considerations such 
as being punctual, respecting women, doing what you say you will do, and being 
environmentally aware.  In addition I take steps to promote personal integrity and 
ethical behaviour, but it’s easy for a foreign consultant to condemn corrupt practices 
and much harder for our local counterparts to avoid them.  Often the best one can hope 
for is to plant a desire and encourage small improvements that will eventually lead to 
positive changes.  
                                                          
15Peacekeeping in The Former Yugoslavia: From the Dayton Accord to Kosovo 1999, The United Nations 
Institute for Training and Research,Course Authors: Mr. Sunil Ram, Dr. Shreesh Juyal
16Malcolm, N. 1998, Kosovo: A Short History, Pan Macmillan, London
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Another way is to contribute to the professional development of the local people I 
meet.  As a strong believer in the importance of education, in Namibia I mentored a 
business school student and in Kosovo I was a guest lecturer for a World University 
Service business programme.  I have also encouraged several promising locals in Kosovo 
to pursue professional qualifications, which has led to several people completing 
business, accountancy or audit studies, opening the door to more fulfilling careers.  
For myself, working in desperately poor countries like Bangladesh and Suriname, and in 
countries that are emerging from violent internal conflict like Bosnia or Kosovo, has had 
a profound effect on me.  The poor physical circumstances and lack of opportunity faced 
by so many people in the world can be overwhelming.  
Of course conditions in the developing world aren’t all bleak and I get a lot of 
satisfaction from feeling I contribute to some real collective benefits by reforming public 
institutions to serve citizens better.
The experience of living and working in different cultures and moving in a community of 
widely-travelled development professionals has been very educational.  I have certainly 
developed a greater appreciation for cultural differences.  In particular, circumstances 
found me working mostly in Muslim countries in close contact with people in societies 
which, following the New York City terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and other 
attacks, are now looked upon with trepidation by many westerners.  The genuine 
hospitality of Pakistani people from all strata of society, from senior government 
officials to peasant farmers, was in stark contrast to the permanent state of anti-
western anger that is portrayed by the news media.  It’s clear that the great majority of 
people in most countries have similar aspirations – peace, stability and good prospects 
for their kids.
On the other hand, I am now very conscious of the many freedoms we westerners enjoy 
so carelessly: freedom of thought, political affiliation, religious belief, sexual practice 
and social and physical mobility.  Freedoms we accept as basic but which are denied in 
other cultures.  
Overall, I have experienced personal growth that I can’t imagine I would have had 
otherwise. 
The next section describes my recent experiences over the course of three 
interconnected projects which, together, gave me the chance to take a leading role in 
introducing a totally new financial governance regime to Kosovo, an emerging new state 
with no history of self-government.  This was a unique opportunity to position Kosovo to 
receive much needed financial assistance, transform the mechanisms that protect 
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citizens financial interests in the public domain, contribute to the development of the 
practice of financial reform more generally and establish myself as a recognised 
authority in introducing public financial management reforms to post-conflict, 
transitional states.
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3. THE KOSOVO PROJECTS 2007 - 2012
I arrived in Pristina, the capital of Kosovo, from Sarajevo in Bosnia after a day-long car 
journey through a typically mountainous Balkan landscape.  Entering Kosovo through 
burnt-out villages and military checkpoints was unsettling but although Pristina was a 
grim post-communist town blighted with bombed out buildings and bristling with NATO 
and UN troops, it was not particularly dangerous for foreigners. 
The country, which was administered by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), 
was in a poor state.  Following severe economic distress during the breakup of the 
Yugoslavian federation and with the economy essentially decimated by the subsequent 
war (Tang 2010)17, Kosovo is rated by the World Bank as “one of the poorest countries 
in Europe”18.
There were (and still are) many inconveniences.  Poor bill collection means the state 
power company frequently runs out of electricity despite owning huge deposits of 
brown lignite with which to fuel the generation plant. Leaky pipes require the water 
supply to be turned off every night.  Piles of garbage fester everywhere and packs of 
wild dogs roam the streets.  But I soon got used to stepping around the rubbish and 
being lulled to sleep by the chuffing of diesel generators and the howling of the dogs.  
Less immediately obvious was the rampant corruption19that exists, with many state 
institutions being captured by private interests and a flourishing illegal trade based on 
trafficking people (and allegedly their organs) as well as smuggling weapons and drugs.
My assignment was to be the first of three related projects to bring Financial 
Management in the GoK in line with EU norms.  The overall liberal democratic standards 
by which new EU members are expected to function are established by the 
“Copenhagen criteria”, a set of rules laid down at the June 1993 European Council in 
Copenhagen that determine whether a country is eligible to join the European Union. 
The criteria require that a candidate country has achieved stability of institutions 
                                                          
17Tang, Stephanie 2010 Balance of Power: Kosovo Topic B: Economic Development in Kosovo, 
Northwestern University. http://www.numun.org/pdfs/2010/BOP%20Kosovo%20Topic%20B.pdf:
18World Bank (2009) Interim Strategy Note for the Republic of Kosovo for the period FY10-FY11 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/KOSOVOEXTN/Resources/297769-
1266424306995/Kosovo_full_report.pdf:
19Transparency International 2010 Corruption Perception Index scored Kosovo as the most seemingly 
corrupt state in the Balkans, 110th worldwide.
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guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of 
minorities, a functioning market economy and the general capacity to cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. 
There is a further requirement that all prospective members must enact legislation to 
bring their laws into line with the acquis communautaire, which is the body of European 
legislation that has built up over the history of the Union.   In preparing for admission 
prospective member states must satisfy the requirements of each individual chapter of 
the acquis.  Currently the acquis is divided into 35 chapters, each covering a with 
different policy area, with Chapter 32 addressing Financial Management.
My role was “Key Expert” on an 18-month EU-funded project to “Support Public Internal 
Financial Control (PIFC) in Kosovo”.  PIFC embodies the EC’s vision for financial 
governance in aspiring new EU member states20, within the framework of Chapter 32 of 
the acquis.  It comprises two functional elements - ‘’financial management and control’’ 
and ‘’internal audit’’ - together with institutional support and oversight of these two 
functions.  The institutional support is provided by ‘’Central Harmonisation Units’’ 
established within the Ministry of Finance, with external oversight imposed by an 
independent Supreme Audit Institution (i.e. a national audit office)21.  PIFC is realised 
through a legislative framework that comprises government policies which are enacted 
in different levels of legislation, and implemented through functional and institutional 
strategic plans by means of technical methods and procedures that are themselves 
supported by practical tools.  
The emphasis of this assignment was on the internal audit component, reflecting 
donors’ fears that development funds and other public resources were not being used 
as intended due to poor management and corruption.  I was one of a team of four, each 
of us bringing a particular skill to a joint endeavour to replace the traditional communist 
practice of centralised inspection with modern internal audit.  
Inspection is a control exerted by a central authority (generally the Ministry of Finance) 
to check individual transactions entered into by government officials to ensure they 
comply with legal provisions, usually regarding proper coding and approvals.  The 
objective is to identify transactions that are in legal error so the perpetrator can be 
identified and sanctioned.  Internal audit, by contrast, identifies areas of the business 
which represent the greatest risks and tests control systems, not primarily to find
                                                          
20 Hill R., Welcome to the World of PIFC (2006) European Commission Directorate for Budget
21de Koning, R 2007 Public Internal Financial Control, self-published 2007
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transactions that are in error, but to identify controls that are not working, with a view 
to correcting systemic errors.  In a sense, whereas an inspector is like a policeman 
looking for illegal behaviour, an internal auditor is like a physician, looking for signs of 
ailments which need to be treated.  Another key point is that the internal auditor works 
for the management of the enterprise, rather than for an external authority.  
Introducing this concept is a key aspect of PIFC.  
The guiding references for our work were:
 an official publication from the European Commission (EC) in Brussels22;
 an unofficial practice guide self-published by Robert de Koning, a member of the 
EC DG Budget team23; and
 the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing 
published by the US-based Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA).
I was one of four “Key Experts” assigned to this project.  We all had experience with 
internal audit, and each of us brought a complementary speciality.  One had previous
experience in Kosovo; one had expertise in organising training; I brought strategic 
planning along with some rather stale operational experience; and our fourth colleague 
was an internal audit practitioner, seconded from the Bulgarian government, a new EU
member state which established its own internal audit structures as a condition of 
membership.  This last member, Ms. Dobrinka Mihaylova, deserves special mention as 
having considerable impact on both the project and my own professional development.  
Together with her regional experience she brought extensive technical knowledge and a 
burning professional enthusiasm24 that infected us all. 
Our objectives on this project were to:
1. develop a change strategy to move from central inspections to decentralized 
Internal Audit; 
                                                          
22 Hill, R. 2006 Welcome to the world of PIFC, European Communities, Brussels
23de Koning, R 2007 Public Internal Financial Control, self-published
24Following her return to the Bulgarian government when its credibility for financial governance was 
damaged by cases of corruption and misappropriation of EU development funds, Dobrinka’s integrity, 
determination and rigorous professionalism have been rewarded with a new post of Executive Director of 
Audit of EU Funds and membership on the Bulgarian Council for Coordination in the Fight against 
Infringements Affecting European Union Financial Interests.
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2. review the Internal Audit Law and subsidiary levels of legislation for compliance 
with best practice; 
3. develop internal auditing skills; and 
4. build an institutional capacity to nurture and guide the profession.
While my colleagues made a start on the legal review and training needs assessment I 
set out to develop the overall strategy by which the new internal audit model was to be 
implemented and the “policemen” turned into “physicians”.   As this was the critical 
starting point for the government-wide reform of the internal audit function I was 
delighted to be assigned responsibility for this task, giving me a chance to apply the 
collaborative approach espoused by Jim Armstrong.  The resulting strategy, which I 
drafted in 2007, is the first of the public works I am presenting with this context paper.
Public Work #1: Strategy for the Internal Audit Function in the Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government in Kosovo – May 2007
This document25 is a plan for establishing the legislative and institutional framework 
that identifies stakeholder responsibilities for implementing a decentralised, risk-based, 
system-oriented internal audit function to replace centralised transaction-based 
inspection. This is expected to generate better value from public expenditure.
As a cross-government initiative, there is a long list of stakeholders:
 the people of Kosovo;
 the Assembly (i.e. the national parliament);
 the Auditor General;
 the donor community;
 the Ministry of Economy and Finance;
 the Treasury;
 Chief Administrative Officers in budget organisations (i.e. Permanent Secretaries 
and Mayors);
 senior managers in budget organisations (i.e. organisations funded by the 
Kosovo budget);
 the internal audit community;
 the UNMIK Fraud Investigations Unit; and
 local training organisations.
                                                          
25Available at http://mef-rks.org/en/central-harmonization-unit-of-internal-audit/strategy-for-the-
function-of-internal-audit
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Each has a role in implementing and sustaining the new internal audit regime and had to 
be brought into the change process.  I applied Dr. Armstrong’s approach of using 
working groups to generate buy-in and ownership from these stakeholders.  For 
background research I reviewed documents produced by other development projects in 
Kosovo, past and present26, UNMIK Regulations and Laws promulgated by the 
Provisional Instruments of Self Government (PISG) in Kosovo, and by conducting many 
personal interviews.  Models ofgood practice were provided by the Australian National 
Audit Office27, the Treasury Board of Canada28 and the US government29.
As part of the strategic planning process we reviewed the legal basis for internal audit to 
ensure it supported the future vision.  A draft Law on Internal Audit had been developed 
with the assistance of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
and the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) and passed by the Assembly of 
Kosovo on November 2006.  As required it then went for final approval by the UN’s 
Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), who had ultimate constitutional 
authority in pre-independence Kosovo. We were able to intercept the law before its 
final approval and identified a number of major departures from good practice. We 
discussed these with the Legal Advisor in the SRSG’s Office and offered 19 suggestions 
for amendments.  Because the SRSG did not want to make amendments to the law that 
would be so substantial as to require its return into the over-burdened legislative 
calendar, we settled on changes that rectified some but not all of the problems we 
identified. I had another chance to introduce more comprehensive changes to the law 
two years later on a subsequent project.  
The final strategy includes the new legislative proposals, a plan for institutional capacity 
building and a redefinition of the roles of stakeholders, all articulated in a detailed 
transition plan.  The plan is accompanied by “success indicators” to provide a yardstick 
against which achievements can be compared, together with a risk assessment and a 
budget estimate for implementing the associated organisational change.
                                                          
26 E.g. United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 2006 Economic Reconstruction 
Project: Development Alternatives http://fiscalreform.net/pdfs/kosovo_tax_and_expenditure_2006.pdf; 
Brajshori, B. 2007 Achievements and Challenges in the Management of Public Finances in Kosovo, 
International Consortium on Governmental Financial Management
27 Commonwealth of Australia 1998, New directions for internal audit: a Guide for Public Sector Managers
28 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 2003 Risk-based Audit Framework and many other related guides
291999 US Government Auditing Standards
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On completion, I presented and defended the strategy to the Minister of Economy and 
Finance who then submitted it to the government for ratification.  As the project 
sponsor and overall authority on PIFC, the EC DG Budget office in Brussels also had to 
accept that the strategy was a legitimate embodiment of its objectives.  After formal 
adoption, the government delegated the implementation of the strategy to the Ministry 
of Economy and Finance to accomplish through our project.  The Internal Audit Strategy 
was now the blueprint for developing a strengthened internal audit function organised 
in decentralized Internal Audit Units across government under the leadership of a new 
central body called the Central Harmonisation Unit for Internal Audit (CHU-IA), in line 
with the PIFC guidance.  The impact of this strategy was noted in a number of 
subsequent reviews:
A “Horizontal Review of the Internal Audit Function” commissioned by the EC under the 
FRIDOM (Functional Review and Institutional Design of Ministries) project two years 
later (Autumn 2009) commented:“…the 2007 Strategy, which represents a solid and 
well-structured approach to the further development of the IA function over a five-year 
period” (page 2).
A practical indication of the success of the strategy (and our subsequent work 
supporting its implementation) can be seen in the Annual Report by the CHU-IA 2010 
which traces progress against key indicators, amongst which:
 From a completely centralised internal audit/inspection group in 2008, by the 
end of 2010 there were Internal Audit Units (IAUs) in 59 budget organisations 
with plans to implement more (this has since increased to 64, covering 80% of 
budget organisations, according to the GoK’s 3rd Public Financial Management 
Reform Action Plan of June 2011);
 Of the 59 IAUs in 2010, 56 followed the required audit planning approach;
 The number of audits carried out and the number of recommendations 
generated continue to steadily increase.
Four years later a SIGMA30 assessment commented on the results of implementing the 
Strategic Plan31: “The Law on Internal Audit provides a solid basis for setting up the 
internal audit units in Kosovo. Ongoing training programmes are part of a systematic 
                                                          
30 Support for Improvement in Governance and Management; a joint initiative of the EU and the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
31Public Expenditure Management and Control, Draft SIGMA Assessment May 2011
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approach that is supported by the current TA32 project. The number of internal auditors 
in budget organisations is still small but has been steadily increasing. The CHU for IA has 
also been relatively active and has been able to communicate and co-operate not only 
with internal auditors in budget organisations but also with managers.  This co-
operation provides a good basis for further development in the area”.
Public Work #2: Internal Audit Manual - December 2008
With the legal basis for creating Internal Audit Units across government in place, 
subsidiary legislation in the form of procedures manuals and Administrative Instructions 
was needed to implement the law, (a) to promote good practice by the auditors, and (b) 
to establish an institutional framework.
An Internal Audit Manual which promotes good practice by providing the methods by 
which auditors do their work according to international standards is a key element of 
the subordinate legislation.  The Internal Audit Manual, which was the result of a joint
effort by three of us team members, is the second public work I am presenting.
Internal audit manuals normally focus on audit cycle activities.  This follows the 
assumption that higher level issues such as the responsibilities, principles, policies and 
audit techniques would be covered by academic reference books used during initial 
training.  However, we determined that there are (or were in 2008 when we produced 
the Manual) no Albanian-language text books addressing modern system-based audit.  
Consequently the manual has a wider scope than normal, providing more theoretical 
and discursive content,to make up for this deficiency.  To avoid the manual becoming 
uninvitingly large, we produced it in three volumes that, while forming an integrated 
whole, could be bound separately for reference by different users.
The 3 volumes are:
Volume 1: Management of Internal Audit Activities
- which is directed towards senior internal audit managers, and those who aspire 
to be.
                                                          
32i.e. technical assistance
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Volume 2:  The Audit Process
- which is aimed at auditors, describing audit team activities through the audit 
cycle supplemented with a comprehensive set of working paper templates to 
help auditors work in compliance with the standards.
Volume 3: Tools and Techniques for Internal Audit
- which discusses the techniques that auditors use to identify, collect and process 
information as evidence of system performance and describes how to manage 
and record that information in audit files and working papers.  
We involved a Working Group of auditors in developing the manual to ensure its 
relevance and usability.  On its completion, we received formal endorsement from the 
Minister responsible to authorise distribution to internal auditors across the 
Government of Kosovo (GoK).    
The impact of the Manual on the internal audit community is significant because it:
(a) removes the association of internal audit with the old concept of central 
inspection;
(b) establishes the auditor as a partner of management, not an adversary; and
(c) provides practical assistance to supplement the theoretical content.
Outside Kosovo our Manual has been presented at various regional conferences by our 
Kosovo beneficiary as a model for the broader PIFC community.  Recent requests (in 
2011) to consider the manual for local adoption have been received from the Ministry of 
Finance in Iceland and a PIFC consultant working in Georgia.  This has enhanced 
Kosovo’s reputation in the region as being able to contribute to professional discourse 
and regional development.  
Again the FRIDOM review comments positively:
“… a very comprehensive Internal Audit manual is in place.  It follows the IIA standards 
on internal auditing and guides IAU Directors and Internal Auditors through all necessary 
procedures for planning audit work ...” (Page 4).
“.. engagement planning has proved to be already quite satisfactory.  The IA Manual is 
of a big help in this (sic), as it is very comprehensive.  All audits are properly planned…  
In almost all cases, a detailed programme of work is developed for each engagement.” 
(Page 5).
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Public Work #3: Administrative Instruction on Establishing Audit 
Committees
Developed October 2007, approved and issued August 
2010
While the Internal Audit Manual is needed to guide the work of internal auditors, 
secondary legislation to clarify the institutional framework is also required.  I worked 
with the Central Harmonisation Unit that had been created by the primary Law on 
various pieces of secondary legislation which are known as Administrative Instructions.  
One specific requirement of the Law on Internal Audit is the establishment of Audit 
Committees, as part of a supportive institutional framework.  These committees protect
the integrity of the relationship between the internal audit function and the 
management they serve, shielding auditors from management interference and 
encouraging management to respond properly to auditors’ findings and 
recommendations.  Since the Kosovo government had no prior experience of them, I 
developed an Administrative Instruction on Establishing Audit Committees.  This 
document is presented as my next public work, as an example of the various pieces of 
secondary legislation that I worked on.  
This work presents: the principles governing the purpose and role of the Audit 
Committee; its relationship with Ministers and municipal authorities, the Internal Audit 
Unit and the Office of the Auditor General; membership; and meetings.  It also presents 
samples of an indicative Charter, job descriptions and terms of reference for the Audit 
Committee.
I originally developed this material in October 2007 using guidance from the UK 
Treasury33, the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (UK)34, and the 
Institute of internal Auditors (USA)35 as the basis for an approach that would be relevant 
in transitional countries.   When the government decided to issue this guidance as an 
Administrative Instruction in 2010 I also referred to commentary provided by Noel 
Hepworth (December 2009) a respected international authority on public sector 
governance.
                                                          
33 Audit Committee Handbook (2007), HM Treasury, Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London
34 Audit Committees (2005) The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy, London
35 The Audit Committee: Internal Audit Oversight (undated) Institute of Internal Auditors, Altamonte 
Springs, Florida, USA
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Since Audit Committees are a new concept in Kosovo this paper has significant impact 
on all government organizations that are now required to establish them, and on the 
individuals selected to serve on them.  From 2009, when no Audit Committees were in 
place, to the end of 2010, thirty six budget organisations are reported to have 
established functioning Audit Committees36.   Since Audit Committees are a new 
concept for all aspiring EU candidate countries this work is an innovation that will 
hopefully have utility beyond Kosovo.  There is no means of tracking the distribution of 
this work beyond Kosovo, but I am aware that it was requested as a model for use by a 
consultant in Macedonia.
Our project was also responsible for a major capacity building programme, developing a 
training programme that would impart knowledge and skills to the newly-minted 
internal auditors.  This was done through a series of seminars covering all aspects of the 
audit cycle documented in the manual presented above, supplemented by a series of 25 
pilot audits, each led by one of us project team experts, to provide a hands-on 
introduction to the application of the audit concepts.  
Our experience in the pilot audits gave us an appreciation of the constraints in the 
capacity of the new internal auditors to apply the standards that we were introducing.  
As noted by USAID in 200637 “The Albanian-speaking majority who remained in Kosovo 
after the war did not include an experienced cadre of technical, professional and 
management specialists ready to take up key positions”.  
In our project, this manifested itself in the lack of planning or analytical skills among the 
auditors with whom we worked. Our methods promote a significant planning element 
in each audit to ensure that effort is expended where it is most likely to generate 
results.  This contrasted with the contemporary Kosovar practice in which planning 
involved not much more than arranging the date to appear at the audit site (hence the 
comments in the earlier FRIDOM review noting the positive impact of the Internal Audit 
Manual on planning).
As much as the front end (i.e. planning phase) of audit assignments was poor, so was 
the back end. Every audit should terminate in a report which relates observed 
conditions to expected criteria, with the cause and effect of significant gaps being 
documented as a finding from which a recommendation is drawn.  This is the more 
                                                          
36CHU-IA Annual Report to the Assembly 2010,Pristina, Kosovo
37  United States Agency for International Development (2006) Kosovo Economic Reconstruction project: 
Development Alternatives, http://fiscalreform.net/pdfs/kosovo_tax_and_expenditure_2006.pdf
Page 30 of 85
interesting part of internal auditing where evidence is analysed and implementable 
recommendations are developed to address weaknesses.  Unfortunately, while the GoK 
auditors can follow the prescribed format, weak analysis leads to poor audit findings 
which don’t indicate how serious identified failures are in the context of the overall 
operation, what systemic weaknesses allowed the failures to occur, or what practical 
remedial action should be taken.  
The consensus amongst my peers in Kosovo, corroborated by conversations with local 
people, is that this weakness in analysis and report-writing reflects the rote learning that 
is characteristic of the Kosovo education system.  This is a serious handicap to the 
development of the nation in all sectors.  I have met with representatives of academia, 
the Ministry of Education and leaders of projects dealing with education reform to 
express this concern.  There is a recognition of the problem, but improvements will be 
slow and results a long way in the future.
These weaknesses constrained the overall effectiveness of this intervention and of the 
projects that followed.  We addressed this by providing courses on analytical thinking 
and communication skills, but a more fundamental reform of the education system is 
required – an undertaking that is far beyond the scope of our project.
Another significant challenge is that many project stakeholders are not familiar with the 
English language.  There is a considerable body of technical knowledge on internal audit, 
but none in the local majority language, Albanian, so considerable time was spent 
translating documents from various international sources for local use. In addition, the 
project generated a substantial volume of working documentation and formal 
deliverables all of which had also to be translated from English.  Similarly, oral 
communications during training seminars, workshops, pilot audits and discussions with 
stakeholders almost always required an interpreter.  This slowed progress and imposed 
significant costs. 
Although my work on this project, and addressing its various challenges, kept me busy, I 
had downtime to be filled.  The presence of hundreds of other internationals in Pristina 
provides for a rich social life.  It’s great to spend time in the company of people who 
have a first-hand world view on important issues.  However, being away from home for 
long periods of time, there is a danger of becoming a nightly fixture in the expat drinking 
holes, so I looked for more productive ways to spend my time.  
Wanting to develop a wider perspective and to extend my consulting skills I looked for 
online courses that address financial governance issues in the developing world.  First I 
came across a course in Citizen Driven Performance Measurement (CDPM) which 
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focused on performance issues in developing country public sectors38.  After I had 
completed that I discovered that the University of London, School of Oriental and 
African Studies’ Centre for Financial Management Studies offers a number of public 
sector policy and management courses specially developed to integrate western and 
developing country perspectives and issues.  This was a good fit with my needs and, 
selecting courses of immediate relevance, I enrolled in the distance-learning classes 
relating to Planning & Performance39 and Reporting & Audit40.  Both courses were 
extremely valuable in synthesising my understanding of public sector best practices and 
how I think about applying them in developing country contexts, and were immediately 
applicable in my project work.  
Public Work #4: Draft Strategic Development Plan for the Office of the 
Auditor General – May 2009
As the project drew to a close in August 2008 I bumped into a team of consultants who 
were commencing another EU project at the Office of the Auditor General (OAG).  We 
got talking about my experience with the Auditor-General of Pakistan and the planning 
work I had been doing with the internal auditors in Kosovo and this led to an assignment 
with their project, initially focusing on audit planning in the OAG.
For this assignment I headed a team of 4 young consultants each of whom had a 
financial or audit background but little experience of public sector audit.  
With coaching from me we worked on improving the quality of the OAG’s audit 
planning, and I delivered:
i. risk-based planning methodologies consistent with INTOSAI and EU 
Implementation Guidelines, supported by comprehensive working paper 
templates;
ii. a series of workshops to promote good audit planning; and
iii. an Annual Plan and an Engagement Plan for each of the 5 OAG Audit 
Departments using the new methods.
My work on these outputs coincided with the appointment of a new Auditor General, 
Mr. Lage Olofsson, by the International Civilian Office (ICO).  Lage is a highly motivated, 
                                                          
38National Center for Public Productivity, Rutgers University, New Jersey, USA
39 See http://www.cefims.ac.uk/cgi-bin/programmes.cgi?func=course&id=44
40 See http://www.cefims.ac.uk/cgi-bin/programmes.cgi?func=course&id=250
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intelligent professional with extensive international experience.  He and I quickly 
developed a rapport and when the requirement to work on a Strategic Development 
Plan for his organisation came up, I was given the job.  
Presented here is the final draft of a Strategic Development Plan (SDP) on which I 
worked closely with the Auditor General.  It was designed to set the agenda for the 
development of the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) during his term of office over 
the 5 year period 2009 – 2013.  Its objective was to establish a national audit office in 
the Anglo-Saxon tradition to provide a sustainable platform that enables the Auditor 
General to deliver oversight objectives foreseen under PIFC and be recognised as a high-
performance Supreme Audit Institution (SAI).  
Other models were considered, specifically the quasi-judicial Court of Audit approach 
that characterises public law countries in transitional nations in central and eastern 
Europe, including the former Yugoslavia41 and the risk-based inspection implemented in 
Albania.  Adopting the national audit office model was a considered decision by the 
Auditor General recognising that this approach is better at implementing INTOSAI 
principles, in particular: operational and financial independence; reporting to the public 
rather than behind closed doors; a scope of audit activities with broader concerns than 
legality and regularity; and concern with control systems.  The draft SDP is a significant 
document since it was developed at a turning point in what had been an ineffective 
organization, to provide direction under the new leadership.  
The Auditor General reflected on the value of the SDP in an interview two years later 
(April 2011), making the following points:
 The overall corporate thrust remains appropriate and the strategic approach is 100% 
applicable.   
 The underlying Anglo-Saxon audit office model has proved to be effective and 
consistent with the overall governance model, based on separation of powers and 
checks and balances on government, which is underpinning Kosovo’s development.  
The advantage of this model has been that it is flexible, encouraging of innovation, 
and performance-oriented.  
 As an overall steering document the SDP has had a major impact internally and 
externally, as a consistent point of reference.  
                                                          
41 Cohen, A-G., 2005, Controle interne et audit publics – Le PIFC – pour une nouvelle gestion publique, Les 
Editions Juridique Associees, Paris
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 Externally, it provides an important means to guide the work of donor partners, 
avoiding the temptation for international partners to push other models that aren’t 
as appropriate to local circumstances.  The SDP also helps parliamentary 
stakeholders understand the mission which in turn has helped secure increased 
funding and other resources.  In addition, the focus that the SDP has brought to 
auditors has been evident to stakeholders in day-to-day interactions regarding the 
principles they stand for and the value they add to the conduct of public business.  
This has enhanced their credibility.
 Internally it helped shape new job descriptions, policies and directors’ mandates and 
has guided the organisation’s growth from 65 professional staff in 2008 to 98 in 
2011 with a further planned increase to 130 professionals by 2013.  The additional 
staff has conducted more audits, covering more of the national budget and 
improved the quality, relevance and timeliness of their work.  
 As a result, the new Republic of Kosovo is benefiting from:
o stronger external oversight;
o a partner in the fight against the fraud and corruption which is hampering 
Kosovo’s development;
o accountability and integrity in financial management and responsibility in 
spending budget funds;
o the OAG’s contribution to the Good Governance element of the EU 
Stabilisation & Association process which embodies the criteria for EU 
membership; and
o improved information with which the Assembly’s Budget and Finance 
Committee can scrutinise public spending. 
Mr. Olofsson and I worked closely for several months on this project, developing a 
lasting professional and personal relationship. Later when I was no longer working on a 
project for the OAG, I provided him with a sounding board for some of the institutional 
challenges he faces.  He served on the steering committee for my next PIFC project in 
Kosovo, and we have collaborated on various initiatives to strengthen the capacity of 
internal and external auditors.
We talk a lot about the challenges and limitations of working in the developing world 
context and about maintaining personal motivation in an environment which does not 
always reward effort with results. We agree it is essential to remain curious and 
interested, and that when cynicism kicks in (as it can when consultants see little 
progress) it will be time to quit.
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Through Lage I have come to see public financial management as more than the 
technical exercise foreseen in the CIPFA blog that kindled my initial interest in this 
business; rather it’s a cultural and political project leading towards public accountability 
which is an essential condition for a flourishing democracy.  He notes that 
“accountability is linked to improved democracy, preventing abuse of power and 
increasing citizen participation”. This provides a sense of mission about what we do, 
beyond simply propagating financial standards.  
My work for the Auditor General in Kosovo also led to an opportunity to offer my 
thoughts to an influential think tank in Greece.  I was pleased to be invited in May 2008 
to make a presentation to a symposium at the Institute for Strategic Policy and Research 
in Athens about good SAI practices, as their concern was that the Greek Court of Audit 
was not effective in monitoring public expenditure.  It was a well-attended event with a 
boisterous panel discussion, during which I presented the benefits of the Anglo-Saxon 
approach.
During this period I continued to explore Niall Ferguson’s political and economic 
histories42 to get a better perspective on why different countries are in different states 
of development, which I complemented with a course on comparative political systems 
at the University of London43.  When this contract expired, I joined my wife who was 
living in Berlin at the time before spending a few months reviewing the financial 
management systems at the Southern Africa Customs Union Secretariat in Namibia, 
another post-conflict state.  Then, because of my track record in Kosovo, I was recruited 
to return for a two year project commencing in September 2009 to continue work on 
the PIFC framework; the source of the remaining public works that I wish to present.
This time Kosovo was a familiar destination and I had the benefit of good professional 
and personal relationships in Pristina.  Both were subsequently invaluable in helping me 
continue the project after I suffered damage to my balance organs resulting from an 
infection I contracted halfway through the project.
There is still an undercurrent of political intrigue and random violence to liven things up.  
Once, my apartment was rattled by a nearby grenade attack on the house of a senior 
civil servant.  On another occasion, an EC office building was bombed, apparently by 
                                                          
42 Ferguson, N., (2006) The War of the World: twentieth century conflict and the descent of the West, 
Penguin Books Ltd., London, and Ferguson, N., (2008) The Ascent of Money: a financial history of the 
world Penguin Books Ltd., London
43 See http://www.cefims.ac.uk/cgi-bin/programmes.cgi?func=course&id=43
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foreign intelligence agents for purposes unknown.  At the time of writing unrest along 
the border with Serbia has resulted in the death of a Kosovo special forces officer and 
the burning of a border post at the hands of Serbian mobs, and the Minister for 
Education was shot dead in his office as a consequence of awarding an important job to 
the “wrong” person.  This is a reminder that, as in Bosnia, the conflict is frozen rather 
than ended.  Once again NATO forces are in control of border security.
Physically, Pristina was less scruffy than when I first arrived 30 months previously and 
was changing rapidly as high-rise developments and new-ish German automobiles 
reflected the amount of cash that was now circulating.  Sadly, this is less a reflection of 
legitimate economic development than of the growth of the black economy.  The level 
of corruption in Kosovo is astonishing.  I quote below several studies to provide a 
flavour of the situation.  
The International Crisis Group44reports:
“More than two years after declaring independence, Kosovo struggles with 
uneven rule of law and a weak justice system ... The police, public prosecutors 
and courts are erratic performers, prone to political interference and abuse of 
office. Organised crime and corruption are widespread and growing”.
“… the judicial system is weak.  Court procedures suffer from widespread 
distrust, fearful or unwilling witnesses and shoddy work by prosecutors.  Kosovo 
lags far behind other former Yugoslav states in the rule of law. Serbian misrule 
and oppression in the 1990s, benevolent but poorly managed and feckless UN 
administration until 2008, a cacophony of advice from well-meaning foreign 
advisers and donors pushing incompatible agendas, deep poverty, entrenched 
suspicion of formal institutions and procedures and a leadership with very little 
experience of government have all played a role”. 
“… virtually none of Crisis Group’s interlocutors in the judiciary, police and 
associated institutions and among EULEX and other international officials believe 
the government fully supports the rule of law.   Many expressed the opposite 
belief, that the government prefers a weak judiciary. An unregulated society and 
economy is an ideal environment for corruption: businessmen with connections 
thrive, while other investment is choked off.  Some observers also believe that 
                                                          
44 International Crisis Group, Europe Report No. 204 19 May 2010, THE RULE OF LAW IN INDEPENDENT 
KOSOVO Pristina/Brussels
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the Kosovo elite is hostile to foreign investment, because it endangers their local 
monopolies, and that foreign companies cannot rely on the justice system”.
The November 2009 progress report of the European Commission (EC) assessed the 
justice system as “weak, vulnerable to political interference and inefficient” and noted 
“an incomplete legal framework, corruption, weak rule of law, high level of informal 
activities... continued to impair the efficiency of market mechanisms”.  It added that 
government performance had actually become worse in some areas, notably in 
managing lucrative public procurement:
“High-level corruption is a more serious problem. In 2009 the Kosovo Anti-
Corruption Agency (KAA) received 34 complaints about government officials, 
seventeen of which were referred to prosecutors.   Public procurement contracts 
account for much of this. Senior officials must disclose their income and property 
to the KAA, but many contracts are signed by junior officials not subject to 
scrutiny, who accept bribes – 10 to 20 per cent of the tender price is apparently 
common – on behalf of their superiors. Ministries have occasionally refused 
payment for completed work so as to extort additional bribes”.
“Kosovo’s justice institutions have yet to indict, let alone convict, a single senior 
government official. As in the other former Yugoslav states, independence has 
been followed by a period of high-level impunity and apparent enrichment”.
This is echoed by the World Bank, which reports:
“… patronage, nepotism and politicization remain serious problems in the 
Kosovo civil service at all levels of government”45, and   
“High level corruption, particularly affecting large procurement contracts, 
privatizations and concessions remains a concern in Kosovo.  Protection for 
organized crime activities related to people trafficking and smuggling is also a 
likely source of grand corruption. … so far there have not been any 
convictions”46.
                                                          
45 World Bank Country Worksheet 2010 15 (c):
46 World Bank Country Worksheet 2010 16 (c)
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Pristina Insight, the local English-language newspaper, runs regular articles exposing the 
extent of local corruption:
“Corrupt Judiciary”: A monitoring project by BIRN (Balkan Investigative Reporting 
Network) revealed nepotism and corruption among judges and prosecutors47.
“Doctors Sell Fake Health Certificates”:  BIRN revealed that doctors in Kosovo 
are selling certificates of good health (demonstrating physical and mental 
capacity for privileges like drivers’ licenses) to applicants without even seeing 
them48.
“Pristina Pays 30 times Too Much for Fire Engine”:  Only four firms bid, all of 
which were registered with the Business Registration Agency on the same day, 
all of whose owners were related, three located in the same office, bidding 
between 300,000 and 379,000 euro to supply a fire engine.  The winning bidder 
supplied a 10 year old vehicle that was accepted by the Municipality of Pristina 
for 300,000 euro despite its estimated value of euro 11,000.  Fire-fighters refuse 
to use the vehicle because they consider it unsafe49.
“Kosovo Agency Accused of Manipulating Land Sale”:  the Auditor General says 
the Privatisation Agency manipulated the auction of a publicly owned industrial 
estate giving the successful bidder a 20% windfall50.
“Political Interference Damaging Kosovo Public Firms”:  Experts say the ruling 
parties are directing the selection of boards of directors in public enterprises, 
preferring party loyalists. Shpendi Ahmeti, director of public policy think tank 
GAP said political parties were keen to control management of companies 
providing key services.  Haki Shatri, former Minister of Economy and Finance said 
most appointees do not meet the criteria set out in the application process.  
Board members meet twice a month receiving between 700 and 850 euros a 
month when the average wage in Kosovo was 200 euros a month51.
                                                          
47Pristina Insight October 15-28, 2010 , Issue no. 49 Pristina, Kosovo p22 
48 Pristina Insight April 8 – 21 2011, Issue no. 61 Pristina, Kosovo p5
49 ibid January 14 - 27 2011, Issue no. 55 Pristina, Kosovo p1
50 ibid January 28 – February 10 2011, Issue no. 56 Pristina, Kosovo p1
51ibid October 30 – November 12, 2009, Issue no. 26 Pristina, Kosovo p5
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Even US Ambassador Christopher Dell, widely regarded as the puppet-master behind 
the government, expresses dismay over the poor rule of law:
“Corruption, violence and abuse go without redress.  The vulnerable lack 
effective recourse, while the powerful manipulate laws and people to retain 
power and accumulate wealth”52.
As a consequence, people who don’t benefit from state connections turn to their own 
clans/families for social security, relying substantially on foreign remittances from 
related diaspora.  These kinship networks are strong and very real – a practical 
expression of mutual support – and serve to disconnect citizens from their government 
and weaken the state.
Current donor thinking is that strong institutions are important in fragile states.  As 
noted by the International Crisis Group report quoted earlier:
“Prevention is as important as prosecution; international pressure should also 
focus on restricting the opportunities for corruption by changing “the system 
that allows for corruption” instead of attacking corruption as a sort of abstract, 
endemic problem.  The best way to do this is to complete the legislative and 
regulatory framework and to strengthen the capacity…”  
My new project was intended to address this through further capacity building for 
internal audit and establishing the regulatory and institutional framework for the third 
element of PIFC, known as “Financial Management and Control”, or FMC.  
FMC is a bit of a misnomer, since it encompasses all aspects of management control, not 
just the financial element.  INTOSAI53 identifies these broader controls as: the control 
environment, risk assessment, control activities, information and communication, and 
monitoring.  As a side note, the fact that I was being tasked with introducing FMC after 
internal audit was problematic.  As the EC’s DG Budget, Mr. Robert Gielisse noted in a 
speech in 2008: “internal audit cannot perform properly … if FMC systems are not in 
place … what would an auditor actually audit?”
                                                          
52ibid February 12 - 25 2011, Issue no. 33 Pristina, Kosovo p13 “Dell on Rule of Law”
53 INTOSAI, 2004, Guidelines for Internal Control Standards for the Public Sector
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This is partly explained by governance authority Mr. Noel Hepworth54 who says 
“Developing internal audit is relatively easy.  Establishing FMC is much harder … So 
usually CHU focus is on internal audit and yet internal audit will not be effective unless 
managerial accountability and robust financial systems exist.  …  implementing FMC 
ought to come first, that is before introducing internal audit“.
For this project I was both a Key Expert and the Team Leader (i.e. project manager) 
adding another dimension to my responsibilities.  The EC expects projects to be tightly 
defined and rigorously managed.  Project objectives, along with a fixed budget for 
professional fees and for out-of-pocket (“incidental”) expenses, are established by a 
project specification developed by or on behalf of the EC.  Success depends on various 
stakeholders and the Team Leader cannot independently ensure success.  
Broadly speaking, the general thrust of development projects is sketched out some time 
before the project is initiated, and may no longer be appropriate by the time work 
begins 12 – 18 months later.  Also it would have been negotiated between donor and 
beneficiary at a much higher level (often involving the head of state) than it would be 
implemented.  The design agreed between the donor and beneficiary is then 
repackaged in Terms of Reference for a proposed project.  This is done by a consultant 
hired for the purpose who cannot subsequently be involved in the project’s execution 
and therefore has no stake in the viability of the Terms of Reference s/he produces.  My 
challenge as Team Leader coming in at the end of this process was to define the project 
to address these Terms of Reference to the satisfaction of a Project Steering Committee 
comprising key stakeholders who may have very different concerns or interests from the 
officials who conceived the project, and from each other.  
This situation can present difficulties for the Team Leader who may be accountable for 
achieving a set of objectives that not all parties support, using a predetermined 
approach that may not be effective.  This is in addition to the normal project 
management challenges of scope creep and budget management.  Fortunately I was 
familiar with all the stakeholders and I had had some influence on the direction of this 
project while finalising its predecessor.
Public Work #5: Project Inception Report – November 2009
The document that presents my detailed project plan is called an Inception Report.  This 
provides the basis for monitoring progress via observable indicators presented in the 
                                                          
54 Presentation to the Regional Conference for Public Internal Financial Control for Candidate and 
Potential; Candidate Countries, 27-29 October 2010, Hotel Regent Esplanade, Zagreb, Croatia
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prescribed Logical Framework Analysis format, and ultimately determining whether the 
project was successful.  
In it I position the project in the context of stakeholder objectives and progress towards 
PIFC achieved to date.  I address various issues such as the capacity of the beneficiary to 
absorb the consultancy outputs (a major limiting factor), coordination with other 
projects and donors, and sustainability of results (which can be jeopardised when the 
beneficiary is not committed to or capable of continuing the processes established by 
the project) (see section 7, page 27).  
I reflected these issues in a detailed Action Plan to guide project activities and provide 
the basis for performance reporting and evaluation, committing to deliver the outputs 
specified by the Terms of Reference over 24 months using 1,100 consultant days 
(provided by a team of more than 20 consultants) and a budget of Euro 1.8 million, 
including expenses (section 5, page 26). 
Preparing the Inception Report involved extensive research to gather information about 
the project environment and over 60 interviews with potential stakeholders after which 
I defended it to the project steering committee and the Minister of Finance who was the 
beneficiary.  This became a critical moment for the project as the Minister, sceptical of 
future funding for this intervention, demanded complete coverage of all auditors in our 
proposed international certification training, whereas I had only sufficient budget to 
train half of them.  He used his refusal to sign off the project as leverage which the EC 
countered with a threat to withdraw the project.  
It would have been a blow to me had the project been cancelled so I continued with 
other activities while working to facilitate a resolution.  Three months was lost before 
this issue was eventually settled in favour of the EC’s position and the project received 
an official go-ahead.
I am presenting this document to demonstrate my ability to plan and manage a 
complex, multi-disciplinary approach to a change programme.  In this regard, the 
document met its objective as it steered the project towards successful completion, 
acknowledged by stakeholders to have delivered the planned results.
While I was preparing the Inception Report I conducted some research to provide 
country context and inform our approach, in the form of four situation assessment 
papers.  These were originally submitted as Public Works, but withdrawn on the basis 
that their findings are reflected in other public works:
Page 41 of 85
(i) Introducing PIFC to post-communist, post-conflict Kosovo
This paper considers financial management in the Government of Kosovo (GoK) and the 
impact of various factors on its change trajectory from central communist control to a 
more modern approach that conforms to EU standards.  
(ii) Culture and Politics as Constraints on the Transformation of Financial 
Management in the Government of Kosovo
This paper expands upon the influence of the “culture” and “politics” components of the 
informal organization operating within GoK as a potential constraint on our reforms. 
(iii) Service Delivery Options for Internal Audit in the Government of Kosovo
Internal audit was an early element of Public Financial Management reform as Kosovo 
emerged from UN administration and began to establish itself as an autonomous state.  
This paper considers whether existing mechanisms and structures optimise the 
effective, efficient and economical delivery of internal audit services across the public 
sector and explores alternatives.  
(iv) Operationalising PIFC in the Government of Kosovo
This paper establishes the elements needed to operationalise the type of 
comprehensive, integrated system of financial governance envisaged by the European 
Commission (EC) in its PIFC concept.  
With these preparatory activities complete I began work on the first project output 
which was a PIFC Policy Paper.  
Public Work #6: PIFC Policy Paper - April 2011
Public Internal Financial Control (PIFC) was formalised by the EC in 1999 to guide the 
development of governments’ control systems and is now an established strategy for 
reforming public management in countries which are candidates for membership of the 
EU.  Each candidate country is required to develop a PIFC Policy Paper that compares 
the country’s present legal and institutional framework with the PIFC requirements and 
proposes actions to bring the country’s PIFC environment up to the required standard.
Coming approximately 3 years after the acceptance of the Internal Audit Strategy, the 
PIFC Policy Paper was an opportunity for me to review the government’s progress in 
implementing modern internal audit and to establish the status of the other element of 
PIFC, Financial Management and Control (FMC).  The concept of ‘management 
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accountability’ is central to FMC.  Like decentralised internal audit, management 
accountability reflects a fundamental change of emphasis away from centralised 
controls operated by the Ministry of Finance to delegation of budgets and spending 
decisions to empowered managers who are accountable for results.
As with the Internal Audit Strategy, I developed the PIFC Policy Paper55 on behalf of the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance (in April 2011 re-focused and re-named the “Ministry 
of Finance”) under the auspices of a multi-stakeholder Policy Working Group.  It was 
similarly ratified by the government, before being submitted to the EC Director General, 
Budget in Brussels (the EC now ‘supervising’ Kosovo in place of UNMIK) as evidence of 
progress towards governance targets and a plan to address shortcomings.  I chaired the 
Policy Working Group which comprised representative stakeholders from the Ministry 
of Finance, budget organisations, the two GoK Central Harmonisation Units, the Auditor 
General and academia.  Its mandate was to review my analysis and endorse my 
recommendations for adoption by GoK.  
The paper specifically notes (page 5) that “By approving this PIFC Policy Paper the 
Government affirms its commitment to implementing PIFC to address current standards 
of good practice for internal audit and financial management and control”.  
Consequently, this work has a significant symbolic and practical national impact since, 
by approving it, the Government makes a commitment to the EU to reach current 
standards for internal audit and financial management and control.  
The PIFC Policy paper incorporates an Action Plan (Annex 3, page 52) which outlines the 
tasks that will fulfil this commitment, which can be summarised as:
 Developing a new government policy on PIFC;
 Strengthening the capacity of the Central Harmonisation Unit for Internal Audit 
that was established by the predecessor project;
 Providing training for internal auditors;
 Developing legislation to implement the new Financial Management and Control 
principles;
 Strengthening the capacity of the Central Harmonisation Unit for FMC that was 
established as the present project was initiated; and
 Providing training for operational and financial managers at all levels across 
government in FMC concepts and techniques.
                                                          
55Available at http://mef-rks.org/images/stories/pdf/dep-
thesarit/Policy%20Paper%20on%20a%20Public%20Internal%20Financial%20Control%20System%20in%20
Kosovo.pdf
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This authorised the direction of the project activities which produced the remaining 
public works.
The PIFC Policy Paper has been well received by the EC and is being circulated as a 
model for other jurisdictions, the most recent requests being from the EC Serbia desk 
and the Ministry of Finance in Iceland, since both countries are prospective candidates 
for EU membership and need to address this key PIFC requirement.
It was evident that the prior PIFC Policy was inadequate, being poorly worded and 
lacking a statement of purpose, context, objectives or how it was to be applied.  
Accordingly, with the agreement of the Working Group I developed a simple policy 
statement which is included as Annex 1 (page 30) to the PIFC Policy Paper.  This was 
submitted by the Minister of Finance for adoption by the government, which happened 
on 27th April, 2011.  The commitment embodied in the new policy is an important 
milestone, giving the EC confidence to continue financial and other support.
With the policy in place I turned to a review of the legislation (broadly defined to include 
laws, administrative instructions/rules and procedures).  As noted previously, the 
legislation that underpins internal audit that I previously worked on has been assessed 
as strong, so our objective was to deliver a similarly robust foundation for FMC.  The 
Assembly had already passed a Law on Public Financial Management and Accountability 
(LPFMA).  Reflecting the traditional focus on budget and cash management, this law 
failed to incorporate broader management authorities and accountabilities so we 
recommended amendments which were accepted and passed by the now-independent 
Assembly.  
Unlike western laws which generally prohibit undesirable acts, states with a communist 
history expect laws to require actors to execute tasks.  Consequently laws in transitional 
states tend to accumulate a lot of detail.  My preference is to draft laws at a “principle 
level”, leaving operational details to subordinate level legislation (i.e. Administrative 
Instructions, Treasury Rules, and procedures), which can be changed with Ministerial 
approval without needing to get into the Parliamentary legislative agenda.  
Unfortunately when this has been tried in Kosovo some ministers have used their power 
to create or amend subordinate legislation for personal gain.  For example a previous 
Minister for Trade and Industry is alleged to have amended an Administrative 
Instruction that cut sulphur levels in petrol to meet EU standards to allow fuel that is 5 
times more polluting into the country, presumably for some quid pro quo.  Further it is 
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alleged that the country’s sole fuel test laboratory is not properly accredited and is 
owned by the same Minister’s brother56.
Consequently I have been forced to follow tradition, and the Laws continue to include 
details which I would have preferred to leave to Administrative Instructions.
Inconsistencies creep into laws, generally because legislation is promoted by 
uncoordinated projects, or through uninformed changes introduced in the legislative 
committee process.  Inconsistencies also occur as a result of laws being drafted in 
English and Albanian, with committee amendments in Albanian that are subsequently 
retranslated into English which remains an official language while Kosovo is under EU 
supervision.  This can result in some unintended language, an example of which is 
provided by Article 14 section 2.9 of the Law on Internal Audit57.  My original draft called 
for “preserving” audit files for a period of time.   The official legislation passed by the 
Assembly instead enshrines in law the requirement for “marinating” them.
The revised LPFMA was implemented by a Treasury Rule which we rewrote to establish 
necessary institutional responsibilities.  Although the principles we espoused in this 
instrument would look familiar to any western manager, the Treasury Rule represents a 
wholesale change to the way government business is conducted in Kosovo.  Our 
guidance introduces critical new concepts, specifically, management accountability, 
delegation of authority (a pre-requisite for accountability), performance expectations (a 
consequence of accountability), and management’s responsibility to assess risks, 
establish a control framework to manage those risks, and do periodic self-assessment.   
Each of these is a fundamental departure from the existing situation in which some 
ministers centralise decision-making and run their organisations as personal fiefdoms.  
The principle of “management accountability” is so new that there is no commonly 
understood Albanian-language equivalent (in the sense of an individual being 
sufficiently empowered that they can be held accountable for the results they achieve) 
and the word is often translated as “responsibility” (indicative of a duty).  
Despite the scale of the changes embodied in this Treasury Rule, it was formally 
approved by the Minister responsible on the 30th July 2010, providing another 
important demonstration to the EC that GoK is developing an appropriate regulatory 
environment.  Operationally, the Treasury Rule establishes the responsibilities of senior 
                                                          
56 Pristina Insight March 11- 24 2011, Issue no. 59 Pristina, Kosovo p1 “Former Minister Faces Fuel Import 
Probe”
57http://kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/ligjet/2009-128-eng.pdf
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bureaucrats.  It is supplemented by a set of operational procedures, which are 
presented as the next public work.
Public Work #7: Financial Management and Control Procedures Manual –
Risk Management – March 2011
The Procedures in this Manual provide guidance on implementing key responsibilities 
established by the Treasury Rule on Financial Management and Control.  As Noel 
Hepworth (quoted previously) has complained, consultants tend to produce “complex, 
long and difficult to follow, manuals” of detailed procedures.  We considered that 
approach would overwhelm Kosovar managers, and would likely be consigned, unread, 
to shelves across government.  To avoid this, we decided to focus more on principles 
than overly-detailed instructions, leaving room for individual government bodies to 
develop their own responses that reflect their specific circumstances.  Further, to make 
the material easier to assimilate we produced bite-sized procedures, aiming for each to 
be stand-alone guidance of no more than three pages or so.  We developed the 
procedures in collaboration with the CHU-FMC, subject to review by EC DG Budget in 
Brussels, and we invited a peer review by Noel Hepworth to validate our approach.  We 
were gratified to receive a positive endorsement and a request from him to use this 
material himself in future.
In total, we developed 14 individual but mutually reinforcing FMC Procedures covering 
key control areas:
1. FMC Implementation
2. Delegation of Responsibility
3. Internal Control
4. Risk Management
5. Management of Assets
6. Authorisation and Payments
7. Revenues
8. Financial Planning
9. Managing Budgets
10. Virement (i.e. transfers between budgets)
11. Capital
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12. FMC Audit Trail
13. Self-Assessment
14. Management Declaration on FMC
These were published in a small loose-leaf desk-top reference – the FMC Procedures 
Manual - along with comprehensive self-assessment guidelines to enable organisations 
to monitor their progress towards PIFC.   Both the FMC Procedures Manual and the self-
assessment tool are innovations of the project that will be useful in other jurisdictions.  
They were considered sufficiently significant that they were officially announced (along 
with the PIFC Policy Paper discussed previously) at a conference of ministers and their 
senior management jointly by a representative of the EC and the Minister of Finance as 
a critical plank in GoK’s governance structure.  The FMC Procedures Manual as a whole 
is the work of my team.  The Procedure presented here in the flagged section, Risk 
Management, is my personal contribution.  It was recently provided to the Ministry of 
Finance in Iceland on their request, as they don’t have a formal approach to risk 
management and wanted a model.
The FMC procedures legally apply to every financial transaction and to every member of 
staff throughout each government organization. The impact is therefore significant and 
will be reflected in better governance and benefits for the public.
Returning to the internal audit component of PIFC, my first project in Kosovo involved 
setting up the CHU-IA to develop the internal audit function.  In the present project I 
continued that initiative by providing continuing support to the Director of that unit, 
documenting my advice in a series of 22 Briefing Notes.  One obstacle to achieving my 
goal of a CHU-IA that nurtures the internal audit profession is that they prefer to 
consider themselves a regulatory body, developing and enforcing instructions, since this 
is perceived to be a high-status role.
Formal capacity building (i.e. training) of the Kosovo public service is another major 
component of my technical assistance.  The first project focused on introductory 
training for internal auditors, and the second provided training for external auditors in 
the Office of the Auditor General.  The capacity building effort associated with this third 
project had the widest scope, giving me responsibility for four complementary 
elements:  
(i) Introducing international certification training for internal auditors;
(ii) Training future trainers;
(iii) Training finance officers relating to FMC; and
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(iv) Developing induction training for Ministers, Permanent Secretaries, 
Mayors and Chief Financial Officers.
Training delivered by consultants is often quite passively received and popular 
attendance certificates have little validity as indicators of retained knowledge or 
operational competence.  Having taken that approach to training the internal auditors 
on the previous project we now wanted to go further, professionalizing the internal 
audit cadre by exposing them to the more rigorous learning and examination regime of 
an internationally-recognised accountancy body.  This would force active participation, 
and introduce an unaccustomed element of competition and performance-orientation, 
first to earn a place in the programme and secondly to pass international-level 
examinations.  The resulting certifications would have some credibility, both 
domestically and internationally, as an indicator of achievement.
Our approach was to sub-contract the preparation of training material and examinations 
to the UK-based Chartered Institute for Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) which 
alone amongst the UK accountancy institutes focuses entirely on the public sector. 
CIPFA in turn delegated delivery of the training to the Centre of Excellence for Finance 
(CEF) in Slovenia, which has considerable regional experience in this field.
We adopted the basic Foundation level of the CIPFA professional programme as an 
attainable qualification.  This level comprises three “international” modules 
(fundamentals of accountancy, introduction to internal audit, governance) and a 
domestic module outlining the national legal environment which was developed 
especially for the project.  Successful completion of invigilated examinations and a case 
study earns a Certificate in Public Sector Internal Auditing, which, with further study, 
can be upgraded to Diploma and Professional qualifications.
Budget constraints limited places in the training so we developed a selection process 
which involved a five-day introductory course followed by a test.  Having regard to 
factors such as years-to-retirement and achieving reasonable balance across ministries
and municipalities, the auditors’ scores in this test determined who got a place in the 
programme.  
As the certification training progressed, candidates’ results in exams for two of the 
modules were poor.  We responded with remedial coaching and additional examination 
opportunities.  Despite this initiative, eligibility for certification remained 
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disappointingly low.  On investigation I determined that the project had introduced 
several unintended obstacles into two modules as a result of language issues:
 CIPFA develops training material, exams and model questions in English which 
were translated into Albanian.  The translation was unsatisfactory since it did not 
recognise the Kosovo Albanian dialect.  In particular there was difficulty with 
translations of technical terms and new concepts;
 the trainers delivered training in second-language-level English through 
simultaneous Albanian interpretation.  This real-time filtering by interpreters 
who are not familiar with the subject matter introduced inconsistencies, 
exacerbated by the lack of Kosovo-Albanian equivalents of some technical terms 
and concepts;
 exam papers are hand-written in Albanian then translated into English where 
they are marked by ESL-level markers with a sample being reviewed by CIPFA.    
I oversaw a detailed review of training material, exam questions and marked exam 
papers which clearly showed students were obstructed by these problems.  CIPFA 
agreed to compensate for this by relaxing the rules concerning pass marks to ensure 
that no auditor who should have passed was left out.  This resulted in a pass rate of 
around 50% of the candidates.  To avoid similar problems in the future, we proposed a 
number of remedies:
 delivering training by native Albanian speakers will be important, so we selected 
the more promising internal auditors and trained them to be trainers;
 incorporating a multiple choice element in the exams, while introducing some 
pedagogical weaknesses, would avoid problems in translating exam questions, 
model answers and exam scripts;
 developing a Glossary of technical terms in Albanian.
Finally we reviewed the translated texts in detail to identify how the local language 
training material can be improved for planned future iterations of the course.
It is inevitable that there will be problems in the first iteration of any international 
programme, but it is important that they are not allowed to undermine the whole 
intervention.  The problems that arose have been dealt with to all parties’ satisfaction 
and we have ensured a continued commitment to this international certification 
programme (a second phase is currently being planned).
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In the absence of a suitable external programme for training financial and operational 
managers in FMC concepts and practices we had no choice but to develop training 
within the project, tailored to local circumstances.  I supervised a team of consultants in 
developing nine modules that complement the FMC Procedures Manual (Public Work 
#7, presented above) and facilitated review sessions with the CHU-FMC to gain their 
approval:
Module 1: Strategy
Module 2: Leadership
Module 3: Organisational Management Skills
Module 4: Risks
Module 5: Effective Budgeting and Cost Control
Module 6: Budgeting
Module 7: Basic Costing Concepts
Module 8: Finance for Non-Financial Managers
Module 9: Finance for Elected Representatives
Whereas this approach to FMC training is fairly typical of technical assistance projects, 
my final training initiative was a significant departure from normal practice.  At the 
conclusion of the initial project to establish internal auditing I had pointed out that all 
our efforts were being directed at the technical level, emphasizing to internal auditors 
that they needed to see their relationship with management in a new way.  However, 
no effort had been directed towards informing management as the other party to the 
relationship.  
This presents a danger.  Elected mayors and ministers in Kosovo are not yet familiar with 
the limitations on their power that modern governance principles impose.  As a result, 
decentralising internal audit so that auditors report to elected officials could have the 
unintended consequence of weakening barriers to official malfeasance.  This is 
especially so considering that many ministers and mayors arrive after Kosovo’s frequent 
elections with no previous experience of public office and tend to see their position as 
one of complete discretionary power over the institutions they manage.  Of course 
there is a raft of legislation to counter this but, as previously noted, implementation of 
laws is poor and capture of state institutions is rife.
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To address this, I recommended training ministers, mayors and permanent secretaries 
(now retitled General Secretaries) so that they understand their legal obligations to use 
public resources for public benefit and the limits on their power imposed by FMC.  At 
the same time I want them to see how they can delegate to their staff, work with 
internal auditors to refine the processes that ensure they meet their objectives, and 
obtain institutional support from the two CHUs.
A well-known report by Lord Nolan, chairman of the Committee on Standards in Public 
Life in the UK, noted that “very large changes in the management and structure of the 
civil service have taken place.  Greater delegation and diversity mean that more positive 
action has to be taken to reduce the risk of impropriety.  In particular, political 
interference in the pay and promotion of individuals must be avoided”.  The Nolan 
report recommended training for ministers and senior civil servants on seven principles 
of public life (Selflessness, Integrity, Objectivity, Accountability, Openness, Honesty, and 
Leadership).
Surprisingly, my research into induction training in different states suggests that, while 
quite a few states (including Canada, Australia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Egypt and 
some African countries) induct new members of parliament to understand their roles 
and resources, there is little oriented specifically towards ministers.  The Rt. Hon. Jacqui 
Smith, former Home Secretary in the previous UK government, is quoted by the BBC as 
saying58:
“I hope I did a good job, but if I did it was more by luck than by any kind of 
development of those skills.”
“I think we should have been better trained.  I think there should be more 
induction.”
“I think there should be more emphasis given to supporting ministers generally in 
terms of developing the skills needed to lead big ministries.”
If a senior UK politician who spent her life immersed in a parliamentary democracy felt 
the need for induction, imagine the need of a new minister in the Kosovo Assembly, 
which has only existed for a decade or so.  Since there is no standard approach to 
inducting newly appointed Ministers I convened a Working Group representing the 
Prime Minister’s Office, civil society, the central government civil service and municipal 
                                                          
58BBC 17 July, 2009: Total Politics Interview: http://www.totalpolitics.com/articles/2463/in-conversation-
with-jacqui-smith.thtml
Page 51 of 85
government with which I developed an outline for a concise Induction programme that 
focuses on:
 the core principles of good financial governance and accountability
 the ethical values and standards of integrity that leaders are expected to adhere 
to
 the importance of financial management and control
 the relationship between Ministers and senior civil servants and internal audit
 the role of  COPF (Committee Oversight of Public Finances).
I recruited two consultants to work with me to develop a “Leadership Symposium” (so-
called because Ministers will never acknowledge that they need “training”) that 
addresses leadership, democratic governance, ethics, and the PIFC framework.  We then 
recruited an international governance expert to deliver the material.  
I was lucky to get Dr. Tom Frawley CBE, currently Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, to 
deliver the main symposium content.  We developed his speaking material together and 
he quickly understood the issues and the areas needing emphasis.  He has a very 
engaging manner and connected well with our senior leaders.  He brought the credibility 
of his background in UK government reform and his experiences in Northern Ireland, 
itself a small jurisdiction with post-conflict reconstruction and governance issues, 
resonated with the Kosovars.  I also recruited the Auditor General, the Chair of the 
Committee on Public Finances and the Minister of Finance (whose speech I wrote) to 
deliver additional presentations59. 
Current thinking is that Induction Programmes are an effective tool for implementing 
major organizational change.  This programme will be significant to the transformational 
introduction of FMC across GoK, shaping the attitudes and understanding of leaders 
now and in the future who will then take charge of important FMC implementation 
initiatives.  Ultimately citizens, taxpayers and donors will benefit through better 
governance.
Public Work #8: Ministerial Handbook – September 2011
As another innovation, I published a Ministers’ Handbook to accompany the induction 
training, that concisely presents some key governance concepts and their application in 
GoK under the new PIFC umbrella.  To my knowledge, there is no similar document 
available to governments in less developed countries, and this contribution should serve 
as a model for other transitional states.
                                                          
59See details at http://www.mef-rks.org/en/press-release/320-komunikate-per-media
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In addition to the technical aspects of institutional development and capacity building, I 
also took a lead role in promoting the new PIFC model when the opportunity arose.  I 
devoted considerable effort to organising three promotional events to attract and 
sustain public interest in our project as a major step in developing the professionalism 
of the Kosovo public service.
The first event was the kick-off of the certification training on May 24th, 2010 for which I 
organised a panel of speakers to promote the importance of this capacity building 
initiative and to motivate the candidates, as well as a question and answer session for 
the media.  The speakers included the Minister of Finance, the Head of Operations of 
the local EC office, the Head of the CIPFA Education & Training Centre and a 
representative of the consulting company for whom I was working.  The event was well-
received and got wide coverage in the local media. 
The next event, in May 2011, was organised to announce the new PIFC Policy and the 
FMC Procedures Manual and Self-Assessment Checklist which support its 
implementation.  This took the form of a half-day conference at which the Minister of 
Finance, representatives of EC DG Budget in Brussels and the local EC Liaison Office, and 
the Auditor General addressed an audience of Ministers and their advisors, Permanent 
Secretaries, Mayors, and Chief Financial Officers.  
I worked with my counterparts in the Treasury and EC Liaison Office to organise this 
important high-profile event.  In addition to handling organisational details I drafted the 
Minister’s speech, essentially a “call to action” delivering a strong message that the EC 
had invested in developing a legal framework and supporting tools and that the 
challenge now lay with the domestic leadership to implement PIFC.  The event garnered 
attention in the local press and is featured on the Ministry of Finance website60.  It was 
considered by the donor to have been very successful.
I held a third promotional event at the completion of the certification training, centred 
on a Graduation Ceremony for the auditors who had earned CIPFA Public Sector Internal 
Audit Certificates and those who had completed the training to become future trainers.  
We also released a new edition of the Internal Audit Manual that I had just completed.  
As well as organising these official formal public events I also delivered seminars on PIFC 
to various stakeholders, promoting this new initiative.  
                                                          
60 See details at http://www.mef-rks.org/en/press-release/299-komunikate-per-media
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Public Work #9: Change Management Paper – September 2011
Reflecting the original project scope, my work focuses on creating the legislative, 
institutional and technical capacity for PIFC; implementing PIFC is government’s 
responsibility and remains largely a challenge for the future.  To help the government 
understand and plan for this challenge I developed a Change Management Paper that I 
am presenting as my final public work.  It is based on the Situation Assessments 
described on page 35, supplemented by additional interviews and the experience gained 
during my work on this project.
In this paper I use the systems model of change management to analyse change forces 
and recommend an approach that is consistent with the cultural landscape in Kosovo.  
One innovation that I have included in my recommendations is promoting the 
development of civil society (currently very weak reflecting the disengagement of 
citizens from state institutions) as the basis for future monitoring of the government’s 
performance.  This reflects the influence on my thinking of my studies with Rutgers U. 
and the influence of Larry Diamond61 who suggests that a “free and robust” civil society 
will help hold the state to account through assessment and by reporting to the public to 
“monitor and restrain the exercise of power”.  
Diamond notes that civil society (defined by Frances Fukayama as networks of 
cooperation that represent a nation’s social capital) serves to stimulate participation, 
promoting the virtues of democracy, fostering skills and knowledge regarding 
associational life along with obligations and rights for citizens and politicians alike.  An 
active civil society could be instrumental in confronting the “cynicism, indiscipline and 
alienation from state authority” that he considers “ … was bred by decades of 
communist rule in Eastern Europe.”
I believe this will be an important development for Kosovo because much of the state is 
run by groups with vested personal interests.  The EC tries to restrain abuse, using its 
power of the purse and the promise of accession, however success to date has been 
limited.
                                                          
61Diamond, Larry Jay Towards Democratic Consolidation, Journal of Democracy, Volume 5, Number 3, July 
1994 pp 4-17, Johns Hopkins University Press
Page 54 of 85
Shanti Kalathil writes62 “my colleague Sina Odugbemi (author of “Accountability through 
Public Opinion”, 2011) suggests that in a mature democracy, the elite fears activated 
public opinion as the only real check on its power ... whereas in many developing 
countries, a divided citizenry and undemocratic public sphere prevent the formation of 
activated public opinion, further consolidating the culture of impunity.  ... the impact of 
the public sphere, and public opinion specifically, might help address the issue of elite 
accountability.  It’s a fascinating hypothesis ... that deserves more attention – not as an 
outlier to good governance practice, but as a central component”.
Because I wanted the Change Management paper to provide a roadmap for future 
initiatives to continue the development of PIFC in Kosovo, I did not complete it until 
May 2011.  Since it was potentially a contentious document, I submitted it for review to 
both Capita, the consulting firm for which I worked, and to my contacts at SIGMA before 
presenting it to the government and the EC. 
SIGMA’s response was very positive saying that it: “…  corresponds practically to all 
what we among others are trying to introduce to the EU doctrine(sic)”.  
The EC DG Budget official who received it commented:  “I really liked your Change 
Management Paper - and indeed I would like to see elements of it brought out more 
strongly in future Policy Papers (of other countries)” and asked for additional copies to 
distribute.
Subsequently, the Change Management paper has had its desired impact and is being 
used as the basis for the next EU PIFC intervention in Kosovo.  I have been recruited by 
SIGMA to develop the proposal for a follow-on PIFC project, based on my suggestions.  
The proposed approach has been positively received by both the EU as donor and GoK 
and I am currently working on a detailed Terms of Reference to guide the next project 
team.  
Following the direction I presented in the Change Management paper, the specification 
for the next project:
 continues innovations that were introduced in my previous project (i.e. 
international professional certification training and induction for ministers and 
senior civil servants);
                                                          
62 Shanti Kalathil, Communication for Governance & Accountability Program (CommGAP) Blog, World 
Bank, commgap@worldbank.org08/04/2011
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 advocates a new emphasis on practical support for introducing FMC in line 
ministries (through on-the-job mentoring by advisors) instead of the traditional 
legal and regulatory focus of technical assistance projects; and 
 introduces a new initiative to begin engagement with civil society.  
The civil society engagement component also gave me an opportunity to promote more 
local involvement in deciding how goals should be achieved, rather than relying on 
models from foreign advisors.   I have done this by designing the civic engagement 
component to promote a competition amongst Kosovo civil society actors to propose 
sub-projects that will engage citizens in the public governance process.  The two most 
promising proposals will then be funded by the project, thus allowing a meaningful local 
involvement in both designing and delivering interventions that will result in locally 
applicable mechanisms.
These Terms of Reference for a new project will not be in the public domain until they 
are announced for tender sometime in 2012 so I cannot presently include them as a 
public work.
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4. RESULTS AND IMPACTS 
This section considers the results of the three Kosovo projects in the context of the 
challenges faced and the innovations that were introduced, and the impact they had on 
various stakeholders.
To recap, over a four-year period between February 2007 and August 2011, in the 
course of three EU projects - (i) Support to Public Financial Control and Internal Audit, 
(ii) Support to the Office of the Auditor General of Kosovo, and (iii) Support to Improving 
Public Management, Control and Accountability in Kosovo - I played a central role in 
establishing the PIFC environment in the new Republic of Kosovo as it emerged from 
post-conflict Yugoslavia with no functioning machinery of government following the 
Serbian withdrawal.  In addition, my previous work with FreeBalance Inc. implemented 
the GoK Treasury system that underpins government financial reporting and budgetary 
control, and in a subsequent assignment I am defining the next phase of the continuing 
development of PIFC in Kosovo.  Together this series of assignments represents a 
uniquely integrated involvement in establishing all aspects of public financial 
governance in a new state, which could provide a model for future initiatives.  
My body of work demonstrates this by including all the instruments needed to 
implement PIFC including policy, laws, strategic development plans, regulations, 
methods, procedures, and action plans, supplemented by guidance for political leaders.  
Additional works demonstrate project planning, situation analysis and change 
management based on disciplined research and analysis.  
I have selected project outputs that demonstrate various key facets of these projects, 
particularly those that represent innovations beyond typical technical assistance.  
Where multiple project outputs address a particular facet of PIFC I have chosen 
representative outputs to avoid unnecessary redundancy.  
These public works should not be judged just on their technical content as standalone 
outputs, but on their contribution to the desired outcome, i.e. providing a governance 
framework that can be implemented in practice.  In this respect, my project methods, 
deliverables and results have been reviewed by: (a) the beneficiary, as being 
appropriate and practicable in the domestic environment; (b) the European 
Commission, as addressing the objectives of its underlying policies; and (c) the Auditor 
General of Kosovo, as advancing domestic public financial management.  In addition, 
various independent third parties (including the FRIDOM project, SIGMA, the IMF and 
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the World Bank) have validated my work, commenting favourably in their broader 
reviews of public management in Kosovo.
For example the World Bank, reported that:
“Kosovo has made significant progress in establishing a workable financial 
management system, including a sound legal framework”63.  
In its review of Strengthening Public Financial Management in Post-Conflict Countries64
covering financial reform in eight post-conflict states, the World Bank commented that:
“Achievements in Afghanistan, Kosovo and Sierra Leone have been relatively 
rapid and substantial.  These cases show that reform progress can be made 
under difficult circumstances – including ... absence of any pre-history of 
independent statehood (Kosovo)”.  
“In Kosovo, the auditing function has been developed under external guidance, 
and the country achieved the best Public Expenditure and Financial 
Accountability (PEFA) rating for that category across all cases”.
The Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Public Financial Management 
Assessment of Kosovo found that:
“Other strengths are found in the areas of internal audit and control and 
external audit where the process is in place and capacity is being built up for 
effective implementation”65.
The most comprehensive Assessment of the governance capacity in Kosovo was 
published by SIGMA dated May 201166.  Since it would be based on information 
gathered six months prior to the completion of my project it does not capture all the 
progress I achieved.  Nevertheless it acknowledges many positive developments.  The 
                                                          
63http://siteresources.worldbank.org/KOSOVOEXTN/Resources/297769-
1266424306995/Kosovo_full_report.pdf
64 Fritz, Hedger & Lopes, Strengthening Public Financial Management in Post-Conflict Countries, Economic 
Premise, Number 54 April 2011, The World Bank, Washington DC 
65http://mef-rks.org/en/download/other-publications-and-reports/2032-public-expenditure-and-
financial-accountability-pefa-public-financial-management-assessment
66http://www.sigmaweb.org/dataoecd/40/29/48970710.pdf
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following extracts are from pages 17 – 21 of that report, with additional 
italicisedcommentary added by me in parentheses: 
“The LPFMA (Law on Public Financial Management and Accountability) was 
amended in the summer of 2010 (following advice from my project) … With 
regard to public internal financial control (PIFC), the LPFMA has now been 
supported by Treasury rules and a full set of instructions for financial 
management and control, which were partially approved by the Minister of 
Finance in 2010, although some still only exist as drafts (these are outputs of my 
project and are now all finalized and approved and have been provided as Public 
Work #7). 
“The introduction of manuals has been accompanied by a series of seminars 
(conducted by my project). With the help of the ongoing technical assistance 
(actually this was completely my work – not just my “help”), a PIFC policy paper 
was prepared and the government approved it in late April 2011. Despite these 
rules and manuals, the PIFC policy paper is relatively optimistic in light of the 
actual practices and capacities in the administration (the document is 
deliberately aspirational, but I believe it is achievable). 
“The most significant change in the system of budget execution is related to the 
ex-ante control procedures of Treasury payments. … To support the transition to 
decentralised control over payments, the Treasury has set up a help-desk and 
Treasury monitoring functions, which essentially should be seen together with 
the unit that acts as the CHU for financial management and control (FMC) 
(whose capacity was established by my project). The Central Harmonisation Unit 
(CHU) for internal audit (IA) focused in 2010 on delivering a systematic training 
and certification programme to almost half of all internal auditors in government 
organisations (this work wasactually done by my project). 
“Regarding external audit, the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) has 
continued to implement its Corporate Development Strategy (this is the Strategic 
Development Plan that I worked on). The number of staff has increased, and the 
2011 budget now allows for 126 staff, an increase of ten posts compared to 
2010. The professional capacities within the OAG have continued to improve, 
and the role of the OAG has become more meaningful for government 
organisations. 
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“The legislation for public expenditure management (PEM) is in place and 
contains many elements that are required by international standards and good 
practice (this legislation, including primary law and subordinate Administrative 
Instructions and procedures manuals, was developed by my projects).  
“The financial management information system is well established (this is the 
FreeBalance Treasury system that I implemented in 2001), but administrative 
capacity is weak, especially for the analysis of data (as I note in the Change 
Management paper). 
“Public internal financial control (PIFC) is still at an early stage of development. In 
principle, a coherent and comprehensive statutory base is in place. The general 
understanding of the concept of managerial accountability as well as ownership 
within the Ministry of Finance need to be further developed, more significantly 
in the area of financial management and control (FMC). The PIFC policy paper 
(that I developed) was recently approved but the level of understanding of 
technical concepts and requirements and of standards of application generally 
appears to be low in most budget organisations. Systemic weaknesses also 
include a lack of qualified staff and a poor overall control environment (these 
weaknesses are identified in my Change Management paper).
“For FMC, the focus is on the secure and efficient management of the financial 
management information system. The new rules and instructions (developed by 
my project) aim to widen the focus to also include good planning and reporting 
arrangements, but these arrangements are still new to budget organisations and 
proper links between budgeting and financial controls exist only on paper. The 
training provided so far to budget organisations is not yet sufficient to guide 
them equally through the first years of application of the new procedures. The 
Treasury has also released its current ex ante control, and responsibility over 
finances has been formally delegated to budget organisations, but it will take 
years of active coaching and guidance to bring all of these organisations up to 
the level that is expected by the PIFC concept (this is what I proposed in the 
Change Management paper and is followed up in the Terms of Reference I am 
developing for the next project). This development is commendable and some
risks have been managed by sequencing the transition, but further risk 
management seems inadequate, especially as the technical assistance (TA) 
project that has supported the process so far ends in the summer of 2011 (I am 
working with SIGMA to address this by providing interim assistance to GoK to 
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maintain the momentum until the next full technical assistance can be delivered). 
The CHU for FMC has been established as a unit within the Treasury and has so 
far been involved mainly in the development of procedures for budget 
organisations (actually doneby my project). 
“The Law on Internal Audit (developed in its current form by my projects) 
provides a solid legal basis for setting up the internal audit units in Kosovo. 
Ongoing training programmes are part of a systematic approach that is 
supported by the current TA project (i.e. my project). The number of internal 
auditors in budget organisations is still small (124 in 2010) but has been steadily 
increasing. With the support of a TA project (i.e. my project), the CHU for IA has 
been relatively active and has been able to start regularly communicating with 
internal auditors in budget organisations. This co-operation provides a good 
basis for further development in the area. However, real progress depends on 
the ability to change the wider administrative culture towards basic 
accountability principles (as noted in my Change Management paper). 
“The Ministry of Finance in Kosovo has demonstrated its willingness to continue 
to develop the system for public finance management. This willingness can be 
seen in the establishment of rules and instructions for financial management and 
control (developed by my projects), the increase in capacities to develop internal 
audit (following training by my projects), and the increased staffing of internal 
audit units. There are signs of sustainability in the development of the internal 
audit units (as a result of support by my projects). 
“With regard to PIFC, the project that supported the development of internal 
audit and of financial management and control (this is the third of the Kosovo 
projects I describe above) will end in the summer of 2011. As the new TA project 
in this area is still in the early planning stages in the European Commission (I am 
working on this as described above), there will be a gap in technical assistance 
for nearly a year (as noted previously, I am also working with SIGMA on providing 
interim help to maintain the momentum). Breaks between foreign assistance 
would normally be healthy, but at the moment in Kosovo in the FMC area, where 
new rules and instructions have just been introduced, such a gap may take away 
the momentum in budget organisations to implement the new procedures. The 
CHU for FMC alone does not have the capacity to fulfill the triggering role that is 
needed (as I note in my Change Management report). 
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“The Minister of Finance needs to ensure that there is sufficient guidance and 
support to budget organisations for the implementation of the recently created 
FMC manual, in particular until mid-2012, when the new TA project (the 
specification for which I am working on) starts. Proper implementation of the 
recent FMC instructions will require close guidance for budget organisations. Any 
future TA planned in the area of FMC needs to focus primarily on the provision 
of direct coaching to budget organisations (this is based on my recommendation 
from the Change Management paper and is a key element of the specification 
that I am developing for the follow-on project). 
“The Office of the Auditor General and the CHU for internal audit are both 
developing their capacities to organise professional training for their auditors by 
non-governmental and private institutions. It would be worthwhile to seek 
synergies in the development of permanent training mechanisms for auditors (all 
the capacity development for the CHU for internal audit and the internal auditors 
was provided by my project and I have been promoting collaboration with the 
OAG on training since 2009).”
Finally, the EC in its report on a fact-finding mission to Pristina in May 201167 confirms 
that Kosovo’s policy and legal framework is now broadly in place and provides for a 
common understanding of:
“... internal control; the policies and procedures that managers are to follow to 
implement and monitor their internal control structures; as well as reporting 
arrangements on the adequacy of those structures”.
The above reviews, especially the 2011 SIGMA assessment, clearly recognise the 
progress that GoK has made in introducing difficult PIFC reforms and the central role 
that I and my projects have played.
These results have been achieved despite a number of challenges in addition to the 
normal problems of managing substantial reform projects.  These challenges have been 
outlined in the preceding section of this paper, and can be summarised as:
 Poor physical conditions in Kosovo in which the project teams operated;
 Lack of skilled professional capacity in GoK;
 No prior local exposure to internal audit or modern management and control;
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 No cultural affinity for the principles underpinning PIFC;
 General acceptance of pervasive corruption;
 Language difficulties, especially in localising a UK-originated professional training 
and examination programme, but also in drafting laws, regulations, manuals and 
reports in general;
 Complex relationships between donor, beneficiary and stakeholders that 
constrained some of our work (such as limiting the legal changes we could get 
implemented) and even threatening the future of the project (i.e. when the 
Inception Report was not approved by the Minister responsible);
 Problematic project phasing, addressing internal audit before risk management 
and controls;
 Limited capacity for absorption of our guidance or for sustaining results after the 
projects are completed;
 Reluctance of CHUs to nurture rather than regulate;
 Project scope is limited to developing the legal and institutional structure: I had 
no role in how government agencies implement the guidance I provided; and
 Maintaining the quality of the work of the project team and over 20 other short 
term consultants who provided input.
I and my project team responded to these challenges with a number of innovations that 
I believe could be applied elsewhere to advance the practice of implementing PIFC in 
transition states.  These innovations can be summarised as:
 Involving GoK internal auditors in defining requirements for training and audit 
manual content;
 Developing internal audit manuals that respect the local context;
 Developing comprehensive guidance for establishing and running audit 
committees;
 Developing simple, adaptable FMC procedures rather than a long complex tome;
 Adapting a UK professional training programme to the local context;
 Training demand-side stakeholders in addition to technical practitioners;
 Developing induction training for political leaders in central government and 
municipalities;
 Publishing a Ministers’ Handbook;
 Developing a comprehensive change strategy to guide subsequent projects;
 Developing a comprehensive technical specification of an internet-based virtual 
meeting place for sharing PIFC information amongst GoK practitioners;
 Promoting hands-on coaching in government agencies; and
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 Involving civil society in promoting civil engagement.
The final item above refers to the concept of “civil society”, which is not generally a 
consideration in financial management projects.  This term is used in its generally 
accepted sense, referring to non-state actors with an interest in promoting socio-
economic development and which can influence, monitor and publicise the results that 
government achieves by using the public resources with which it has been entrusted.  
Acknowledging that this sector is still underdeveloped in Kosovo and is often subject to 
politicisation in a small countries, there are nonetheless examples of independent civil 
society actors in Kosovo including NGOs (e.g. GAP and KIPRED), voluntary service 
organisations (such as Rotary International), chambers of commerce, religious 
institutions and student unions which can be encouraged to play a role.  Labour unions 
are likely to emerge to provide a voice for workers along with special interest groups, 
and it would be interesting to find a vehicle for including clan leaders as well.  In 
essence, civil society provides the vehicles through which motivated citizens can 
participate in setting and overseeing national priorities. 
In addition to the technical innovations introduced in my projects, various challenges 
were addressed by monitoring the project’s results and developing remedial measures 
when things did not go according to plan (as was initially the case with the internal audit 
training results).   I must acknowledge the commitment and effort of all the 
administrative and technical staff of the projects, as well as good cooperation from the 
donor office, the beneficiary and other third parties in helping to overcome these 
difficulties.  
Taken together, these projects and the public works they produced have had 
considerable impact on a number of stakeholders.  These impacts are reviewed in the 
following sections. 
1. Strengthening governance in Kosovo 
For the Government of Kosovo as the beneficiary, my work establishes a PIFC 
environment that addresses official domestic objectives and international expectations.  
The official domestic objective is to implement effective financial management, to:
 improve infrastructure and the quality of citizens’ lives;
 use money and other resources entrusted for these purposes efficiently;
 comply with Laws and other decisions taken by the Assembly;
 enable public accountability for government performance; and
 reduce opportunities for official corruption.
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Achieving these objectives in a new state with no experience of self-administration is a 
long term initiative and it is premature to declare the process complete.  However, a 
solid foundation has been established, as was demonstrated by the various assessments 
quoted above.   
I was keenly aware of the challenge of sustaining the progress made during this 
intervention, given the criticism that technical assistance benefits often cease once the 
sponsoring project is over.  To address this we incorporated the following elements into 
our project approach:
 working closely with our counterparts to help them identify and address PIFC 
implementation issues without allowing the project to assume operational 
responsibilities helped develop domestic expertise and confidence and will 
hopefully reduce future dependency on consultants;
 our intervention creates programmes that are specifically designed to continue 
after the project has demobilized, specifically:
o Internationally-recognised certification of internal auditors;
o FMC training programme for budget organizations;
o Induction programme for senior leaders.
 a solid relationship has been developed between CIPFA, as the authority that is 
certifying internal auditors, and the CHU-IA that is responsible for continuing the 
certification programme for internal auditors;
 I developed a joint proposal with the Auditor General for continued CIPFA 
certification training, and we have prepared the CHU-IA to take the lead role on 
managing this future training programme.  I also negotiated a costed plan for 
providing ongoing training support with CIPFA.
 twelve GoK professionals have been prepared to be CIPFA-certified trainers, so 
they can contribute to local training duties from a position of technical 
knowledge that they can express in the local language;
 high quality reference manuals have been developed to provide a source of 
operational guidance:
o FMC Procedures Manual;
o FMC Self-assessment Checklist;
o Revised Internal Audit Manual;
o Ministers’ Handbook.
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 policy and implementation guidance has been provided to the government in 
two important strategic documents which will also help guide the design and 
implementation of future technical assistance:
o PIFC Policy Paper; and
o Change Management Paper.
 a strong legislative framework is in place together with guidance for improving 
future harmonization.
The PIFC environment is also critical in meeting international expectations so as to 
enhance Kosovo’s access to donor funds and IMF loans, and support its eventual 
accession to the EU.  This has already had an impact, contributing to the improved 
governance that has enabled Kosovo to be admitted to the IMF and to access 
substantial funding.68
This progress positions Kosovo for continuing project support and the sustained 
improvement to governance that will result, evidenced by the current negotiations 
between GoK and the EC for a follow-on project.
The success of these projects in establishing the instruments of PIFC also fulfils the 
requirements of the EU accession process for the benefit of Kosovo, although the 
weaknesses of some member states exposed during the current euro-zone crisis are 
likely to push new admissions further into the future than we anticipated when starting 
these projects.
2. Meeting EC objectives
In the narrow sense of meeting the EC’s project objectives my work has been judged a 
success, verified by the EC’s own audits.  This means the EC can have greater confidence 
that its assistance to Kosovo now and in the future will be used appropriately, although 
much depends upon parallel efforts to strengthen judicial processes.
Taking a broader perspective, the modern vision of effective financial governance is a 
fundamental departure from the historic centralized control practiced in Yugoslavia (and 
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Kosovo as one of its provinces).  It is critical to the EU that Kosovo is successful in 
achieving this frame-breaking transformation so that it will fit into the liberal democratic 
fabric of the community as a peaceful, contributing member state which fulfils the 
expectations of the Copenhagen criteria outlined in Section 3 above.  Ultimately success 
depends on the able, honest and diligent adherence to laws and application of the 
technical methods that my projects developed, and a cadre of appropriately skilled and 
motivated officials to implement PIFC.  This will be an ongoing process for at least the 
next 5 years, for which the momentum has been created and a roadmap for change (the 
Change management Paper) has been provided that is currently being used in defining 
the next two years of EU-assisted reform in Kosovo’s public governance.
3. Impact on the Profession
My objective for these projects was not simply to produce outputs to be implemented 
in Kosovo, but to produce instruments that would also, with adjustments for local 
circumstances, help other jurisdictions advance towards EU standards.  
From the profession’s perspective my work provides a pragmatic model of how PIFC 
requirements can be effectively addressed by nations with substantial environmental 
and resourcing constraints.  Unfortunately the way that consultants’ work is published 
does not generally allow for author attribution.  Conceptually, reforms have to be made 
by the organs of the sovereign state and each donor wants to ensure that it gets 
recognition for its enabling financial assistance.  Rarely does the consulting firm under 
whose banner the projects are implemented get any credit and rarer still is an 
acknowledgement of the individual consultant or project manager.  Similarly, there is no 
protocol for citing the work of other consultants (although documents may be named in 
a “References” section of a report).  Consequently there is no means of tracking the 
influence my works have had on other projects and in other jurisdictions.  
What I do know is that individual consultants have asked me for some of my public 
works to use as references for projects in other countries; the Internal Audit Manual has 
been presented by the Director of the CHU for Internal Audit at various regional 
conferences and I have received requests for it from the EC Georgia desk; EC DG Budget 
has asked for multiple copies of the PIFC Policy Paper, FMC Procedures Manual, FMC 
Self-assessment tool and the Change Management paper expressly to distribute around 
the EC office and noting their applicability in other countries; and the Ministry of 
Finance in Iceland requested copies of the Internal Audit Manual, the FMC Procedure on 
Risk Management, and the PIfC Policy paper as a starting point for their own PIFC 
assessment. The international certification training for internal auditors pioneered in 
the Kosovo projects is now being implemented in Macedonia.  Also, being asked to 
Page 67 of 85
present in Greece was an opportunity to advance the discussion about external 
oversight to policy makers in that country.
I am hopeful that the innovations that I and my team introduced will propagate to other 
states to help accelerate their progress towards effective financial governance through 
my contacts at the EC DG Budget, SIGMA and in the profession. 
More narrowly, this project has been a success for the consulting firms for which I 
worked (Austrian Human Dynamics and Ireland-based Capita International 
Development), contributing to their profile and reputation in Europe.  At the time of 
writing, Capita has indicated its intention to develop a case study of the last of my three 
projects for submission to the UK Management Consultants Association as an example 
of a successful international development project.
4. Impact on my development
Working in Kosovo has presented a unique experience, being part of a multi-national 
initiative to develop an entire state infrastructure essentially from scratch.  As a new 
country with no history of self-government, few administrative skills and no legal or 
institutional capacity, everything was needed.  In the nature of things, not everything 
goes to plan or is an unqualified success, but being involved in this complex and 
worthwhile endeavour along with so many top class development professionals from all 
sectors has been a tremendous growth opportunity for me. 
Professionally, this work has had a profound influence on my development in a number 
of dimensions:
 Deepening my experience working with the EC and my understanding of the 
constraints under which it operates;
 Integrating the separate technical domains of internal audit, external audit and 
public financial management within a single governance framework;
 Appreciating the socio-cultural aspects of implementing change beyond the 
provision of technical assistance;
 Integrating development of human resources, institutional capacity, legal 
frameworks and operating culture in linked initiatives;
 Consolidating my professional understanding of change management through 
work at all levels within the national government, encompassing Ministers, 
ministerial staff, Mayors, permanent secretaries, senior management, and 
operational staff;
 Exposure to the work and insights of many international experts working 
concurrently in other aspects of nation-building; and
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 Extending my experience of working in transitional (post-communist) and post-
conflict environments in the EU periphery.
I have also had to accept the constraints imposed on consultants working on financial 
management technical assistance contracts.  Despite being a titular “expert” the 
consultant on the ground has little opportunity to stray outside the parameters 
previously established by each project’s Terms of Reference (TOR), since they general 
specify the use of “best practices” meaning that not only the project’s objectives but 
also the methods (i.e. standards developed in and for western environments) are pre-
defined. 
It is extremely difficult to obtain approval for substantive changes to the TOR, as this 
would involve different levels of management in the local donor office and at 
headquarters, and in the beneficiary organisation, as well as and other stakeholders via 
the Steering Committee. This constrains a consultant who wishes to address the 
principles of the Copenhagen criteria, but who does not feel that the normative 
prescriptions of best practice represent the most effective way forward in the context of 
local conditions.
However, my experience has been that donors are open to input from consultants at 
the end of each project to inform the development of the TOR that will underpin the 
contract for the next one if they can be convinced that the ultimate destination will be 
in compliance with official expectations.  In this respect I was fortunate to have 
participated in a series of related projects, giving me the opportunity to make 
recommendations at the end of each project that influenced the direction of 
subsequent projects for which I was responsible.  This opportunity was greatly 
expanded recently when I was contracted specifically to develop the whole TOR for the 
next project that will be implemented sometime in late 2012.
Taken together, the result of my experience in Kosovo has been to establish me as a 
recognised authority and effective practitioner in this area of consultancy.  This has a 
practical advantage since consulting firms now approach me to join them in bidding for 
financial governance projects, rather than me having to chase down new assignments.  
Furthermore, the EC has demonstrated its confidence in my domain experience by 
approaching me to review the PIFC environment in Iceland under its TAIEX69 programme 
as a precursor to its potential accession to the EU, and SIGMA has contracted me to 
define the terms of reference for a follow-on project for Kosovo and to provide ongoing 
advice to the GoK Treasury Department.
More important than my technical development, though, is the intellectual 
development that I have experienced as a result of these projects.  My work in Kosovo 
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and the obstacles I faced, particularly in transposing western models into an 
environment for which they weren’t designed, has caused me to reflect on my work and 
look for ways in which future interventions could be more effective.  My reading on this 
topic encourages me to believe that there is a growing dissatisfaction with the way 
things are done (reinforcing the conversations I had with Dr. Armstrong some years ago) 
and a consensus for a new approach is emerging, at least in academic circles.  I am 
hopeful that having developed some credibility in my domain I will be in a position to 
help shape future practice.  In fact this is already happening in my present work with 
SIGMA, defining a new approach to implementing PIFC for the next EC initiative in 
Kosovo.  The next section presents key influences on my thinking that hopefully herald a 
growing momentum for a re-evaluation of our current development models and 
practices, and which I would like to help propagate amongst practitioners.  
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5. A NEW PARADIGM? 
As noted above, my projects have had a positive impact on governance in Kosovo and 
satisfied the terms of reference to which I was working.  However, considerable work is
required before the EC’s desired transformation to PIFC in Kosovo is fully achieved. 
Cultural constraints make this a generational endeavour.   The Change Management 
Paper presented previously identifies the constraints that will hold back the 
implementation of the PIFC model in this new post-conflict state.  Briefly these 
constraints include:
 Public administration in Kosovo is not yet governed by legal rationality but by 
social (clan) pressures and self-interest; 
 Compliance with new models tends to be ritualistic, with administration being 
accomplished by personal intervention as much as due process;
 The poor capacity of individuals cannot be adequately addressed through 
technical training;
 Because civil servants at all levels receive the same technical training at the same 
time, the internal mentoring that is a normal part of career and capacity 
development cannot be effective;
 There is no tradition of professionalism;
 There is a strong connection to traditional ways of working based on personal 
relationships, deference and hierarchy that are unconcerned with performance; 
and
 Citizens do not engage with the state.
In addition, a basic assumption underpinning the western normative model is that 
corruption (as we define it) is exceptional.  In my experience this is a false assumption: 
influence peddling, rent-seeking, impunity and favouritism are widespread and exist at 
all levels.  Under these circumstances concepts like the merit principle, personal 
accountability and performance management are compromised.  Also, where collusion 
amongst related parties is the normal way of doing business, the western concept of 
internal control, which assumes that more eyes reduce the possibility of malfeasance, is 
emasculated.
These circumstances don’t just apply in Kosovo.  In light of this reality I feel that future 
governance interventions need a different approach.  Our “best practices” approach of 
arriving on the scene saying “we understand your needs and we have the solutions” 
feels uncomfortably patronising, and unlikely to be successful.  This has prompted me to 
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look for alternative ideas and I have discovered a growing body of research that 
recognises best practices to be potentially unaffordable, infeasible, and inappropriate 
for small, uneducated, poor developing countries.  Some of the voices arguing against 
the current approach are reviewed below.
Paulo Mefalopulos70 suggests:
“The intrinsic belief behind modernization is that any problem can be solved 
providing the right method is followed and the ‘right’ (technical) solution is 
identified and devised.  Despite ... resources invested ... top experts ... many 
innovations ... the results have been less than satisfactory”.  
He proposes the most crucial and often neglected factor is “the human factor”:  
“Despite the fact that technical solutions have always to be endorsed and 
adopted by people, they were mostly considered as passive recipients of 
initiatives (when not a major obstacle to development).  The positivist-based 
assumption that when there is a problem there is always one and only one 
solution, has been proven wrong over and over again”.
Robert Anderson71, a development consultant and former World Bank economist, 
believes that institutions like the World Bank and the IMF recommend sophisticated 
policies that governments in poor countries cannot successfully implement.  Instead of 
adopting rich countries’ policies, he recommends an approach that takes into account 
institutional weaknesses typical of developing countries - corruption, deficient rule of 
law, cronyism, etc.  Simpler policies are more suitable to poor countries' institutional 
environments and more likely to produce positive results.  He argues that since "rich 
countries were once poor countries", reaching into rich countries' pasts might yield 
more appropriate models for poor countries today.
Turner and Hulme72 reviewed the complexities of the economic, social and political 
environments in developing countries and challenge the uncritical way in which often 
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inappropriate institutional arrangements have been imported from Western 
industrialised countries.  
Well-known commentator Frances Fukayama73 investigated the interconnectedness of 
economic and cultural life, finding that economies are nestled in societies and cultures 
and suggesting that successful development should combine traditional culture and 
modern institutions.
More recently, Noel Hepworth in a 2010 presentation to the Regional Conference for 
Public Internal Financial Control for Candidate and Potential Candidate Countries74, 
speaking specifically about introducing PIFC in the Balkans, noted:
“What we see in many countries are attempts to introduce sophisticated 
reforms.  ... for such reforms to actually work effective management 
arrangements are required ... even the most developed of countries have great 
difficulty with these techniques ...”
He went on to say, 
“One of the real implementation problems is that the reforms are regarded as 
technical not cultural.  They require a different style of public management from 
that found in most Balkans countries.  What we see in Balkan countries is a 
public management that is based on a lack of trust, specifies in detail how 
activities are to be carried out in rules, regulations and processes which are 
extremely complex and are open to political manipulation and corruption.  These 
rules usually do not reflect modern circumstances ... or, very importantly, the 
expectations of citizens. 
... And because they are cultural reforms there is much more to their 
implementation than technical changes and they take much longer to achieve 
than most timescales allow.  The consultant expertise that is demanded by 
countries and by donor agencies is almost always about technical knowledge of 
the techniques with no recognition of the need for changes in the culture of 
management.  In summary, introducing managerial accountability (a pillar of the 
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Chapter 32 requirements for the introduction of PIFC) challenges some 
traditional and in the Balkans, cherished ideas”
In the course of my reading I came across an excellent study from the Institute of 
Development Studies in Brighton.75  It proposes a new way of approaching governance 
challenges that addresses these realities.   
The study paints a familiar picture of the development problem:
“governments of poor countries are unable to exercise effective, accountable 
public authority. They are unable to control their territories and populations, 
often ceding ground to armed groups and criminal networks. They are unable to 
deliver basic public goods and services. Where authority does exist, it may be 
coercive and lack legitimacy. Power is concentrated in relatively few hands. 
Governments are unresponsive to large populations: poor people, women, and 
specific regional, ethnic or linguistic groups are politically excluded.
It reviews standard development interventions:
“Evaluations have shown the limitations of programmes designed to strengthen 
rules-based approaches through civil service reform, anti-corruption measures, 
rule of law programmes, democracy support, or attempts to improve the 
investment climate. ... institutional models cannot be transferred into very 
different social and political environments and be expected to take root and 
function as they do in OECD countries”.
It then proposes that a key reason for the failure of the current approach is that 
informal institutions and personalised relationships, characterised by political 
patronage, rent seeking, and vested interests, are seen as governance problems to be 
eradicated through reforms that promote accountability, transparency and rules-based 
behaviour.  The research suggests that, instead, they could become part of the solution: 
“Programmes to improve the investment climate, strengthen the rule of law, or 
fight corruption do not fail just for lack of ‘ownership’ or attention to politics. 
They fail because they make the wrong starting assumption: that progressive 
change consists in, and can be achieved through, strengthening formal, rules-
based institutions that reflect a clear division between public and private spheres 
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of life. The key to making progress in the short-to-medium term may not be 
direct external intervention to orchestrate and support rules-based reform, but 
more indirect strategies to shift or influence the incentives and interests of local 
actors”.
So effective interventions might include supporting constructive bargaining between 
public and private actors.  As an illustration, at the time of Botswana’s independence it 
was recognised that the indigenous tribes were a locus of influence.  Rather than 
ignoring this reality, its constitution enshrines it by establishing an upper house in which 
votes are allocated to the tribes, and which must support initiatives from the lower 
house before they can become law.   Indeed, our own notion of participatory democracy 
was borne of a bargain that gave common people the vote if they allowed the gentry to 
retain their wealth.  In the development context such bargaining could be based on 
understanding issues such as: “What is shaping the interests of elites? ... What is 
shaping relations between politicians and investors, and might they have common 
interests in supporting productive investment? What might stimulate and sustain 
collective action by social groups to demand better services? What informal local 
institutions are at work, and how are they shaping development outcomes? Where does 
government get its revenue from, and how is that shaping its relationships with 
citizens?”
The report considers how consultancy practitioners’ “default position is to look at the 
world from the perspective of a ‘developed’ country, aspiring to introduce governance 
reforms that would align the institutions of poor countries in the South more closely 
with those of an OECD state”.  This mirrors the assertion the “conventional donor 
approach to governance has been to analyse problems in developing countries in terms 
of deficiencies when compared to this ideal model”.
This approach persists even though “Western policymakers seem to recognise that 
improving governance involves far more than transferring formal institutions from rich 
to poor countries. Yet they find it very hard to discard developed country models”.
The study suggests that:
“a critical underlying cause of state fragility is the lack of elite incentives to 
create effective public authority. A major reason is that the global environment 
has provided unprecedented opportunities for elites with transnational 
connections to profit from weak governance and ongoing conflict. Effective 
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policy interventions therefore need to focus on ways of shifting these perverse 
incentives”.
“Where public institutions are already weak, they can be further undermined by 
high aid inflows. These can reduce incentives for elites to increase economic 
growth in order to expand public revenue, and weaken the need to bargain with 
citizen taxpayers.   Elites include people with formal power (businessmen, 
politicians, wealthy professionals or religious leaders) but also people with 
informal power (as warlords, or leaders of narcotics or other criminal networks). 
They matter because it is elites – people with high levels of political, 
bureaucratic, military, financial and economic power – who can make crucial 
policy choices to support or undermine public authority”.
Accordingly the paper advocates:
“...less of a focus on direct action to build formal institutions, eliminate 
corruption or supply external sources of security; and much more of a focus on 
action to address the sources of perverse incentives that undermine elite 
interests in building effective public authority”. 
This suggest strategies that “focus less on the long-term destination of rules-based 
governance, and more on incremental ways of making progress in the short-to-medium 
term through coalitions and relationships between key actors”.
The overarching finding is that informal institutions and personalised relationships are 
pervasive and powerful and should be co-opted to contribute to progressive outcomes 
in poor countries. Creating formal democratic government and market institutions 
remains a valid long-term aim. But in the short-to-medium term informal arrangements 
and relationships can help stimulate investment, improve services, connect citizens to 
the state and facilitate the transition to more inclusive, rules-based governance.
I have quoted this paper at some length because it resonates with my experience, 
eloquently making the case for reviewing the standard donor approach to governance 
reform to address the kinds of obstacles that we face in the field.  Taking the 
conclusions of this study I want to advocate for an approach in my own field that 
acknowledges and involves informal channels like clans and encourages citizen 
engagement through civil society.  In this, it has to be recognised that clans are not a 
substitute for formal government:  they are too small to implement large scale 
interventions (it needs a central government to build a road to a sea port, for example) 
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and, of course, they only represent people who are accepted in the clan.  The method of 
adopting this approach would need to be formulated for each intervention and would 
not be without difficulty, but the results could repay the upfront investment in an 
innovative project design many times.
In addition to promoting broader engagement as a method for reform, I also want to 
advocate a new definition of what we are bringing to the reform process.  Current 
thinking suggests that the notion of a pre-defined normative model is inappropriate.  
However, it is valid to require compliance with a commonly understood set of standards 
when joining any sort of club, whether the EU, a trading block or a military alliance.  To 
avoid the well-documented, and worryingly neo-colonial shortcomings of importing 
ready-made solutions, I propose that instead of defining the standards by the rules that 
implement them (i.e. our best practices), we agree on the non-negotiable principles that 
underlie the agreement and negotiate the locally-implemented standard based on those 
principles, i.e. the “what” is fixed, the “how” is negotiated to reflect the conditions.
In the context of PIFC initiatives like the ones I have been involved with in Kosovo, the 
EU has defined the non-negotiable principles in the Copenhagen criteria, but then has 
gone beyond describing what is required to prescribe the specific means (the best 
practices and the PIFC structures and acquis rules) by which it is to be achieved, without 
considering the divergent environments in which they would be expected to operate.
A comprehensive study by the UN into Reconstructing Public Administration after 
Conflict76 reflects on this.  Recognising that “the central cause of violent conflict is weak 
governance institutions” it acknowledges that “although there is a great emphasis on ... 
technical and managerial skills, it is equally important to develop trust between leaders 
of competing factions and among competing factions themselves”.  It argues that 
“establishing formal rules of governance is not enough; their underlying values and 
belief systems must also be internalised by all actors”.   Reflecting previously-referenced 
commentary, the report goes on to say: “ ... there is no one-size fit all institutional 
solution to governance challenges.  In each country, institutional reforms should be 
tailored to current needs while taking into account the legacy of pre-existing 
institutions.  Rebuilding the same institutions that led to violent conflict should be 
avoided, but some traditional practices might be worthy of retaining or creatively 
adapting”, citing Uganda and Rwanda as examples where this has happened.
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So, for example, if we reformers defined good governance, and therefore our project 
outcomes, to be Lord Nolan’s Seven Principles of Public Life77 (Selflessness, Integrity, 
Objectivity, Accountability, Openness, Honesty, and Leadership) we could work from 
these with our local counterparts and the sponsoring donor to establish implementing 
mechanisms that are legitimate and feasible in the local context that are also accepted 
as addressing the overriding objectives of the club.  By bringing principles, not 
structures, we could work with stakeholders in a truly participative way to help them 
find their own means of addressing the principles.  In short, replacing an approach that 
prescribes foreign solutions with an approach that negotiates agreements on goals or 
principles and recognises that governance is about people, not process.
Often the stakeholders are defined so as to exclude ordinary citizens.  This ignores the 
potential contribution of activated public opinion, which Sina Odugbemi and Taeku Lee 
identify78 as a critical force in any public political culture in compelling direct 
accountability.  I believe that some means of involving broad public opinion as an actor 
in the negotiation is important, and would serve as a counterpoint to involving the 
acquisitive elites.  
The challenge is to find a way to involve the public.  Historically disengaged from their 
communist government institutions, it will be necessary to educate citizens concerning 
their potential role in setting public priorities, monitoring results and holding 
governments and public institutions to account for their performance in meeting public 
aspirations.  This is difficult to achieve absent a large income tax-paying middle class 
which can be encouraged to demand some level of value-for-money.  In Kosovo, few 
people pay direct taxes and the tendency is to see official misappropriation as a 
problem for the donors who support the administration.  My approach would be to re-
orient their perspective so that citizens see waste and misdirection of public resources 
as hurting the public benefits that they value, such as health, education, pensions and so 
on, and thereby encourage a general demand for better stewardship.
An issue is to identify a suitable mechanism that engages non-political unconnected 
individuals.  Rakesh Mohan, Indian economist and reformer, currently Non Resident 
                                                          
77Standards in Public Life: First Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life (1995), House of 
Commons
78Odugbemi, S and Lee, T, Accountability through Public Opinion: From Inertia to Public Action, 2011, 
World Bank Publications, Washington, DC
Page 78 of 85
Senior Research Fellow of Stanford Centre for International Development, Stanford 
University, proposes achieving this through the establishment of Think Tanks79 that 
nurture the development of political thought, public engagement and ultimately 
accountability.  This approach is likely to require a fairly long term horizon, and would 
not be feasible in the context of a financial management technical assistance.  As an 
alternative I have proposed a shorter term initiative for Kosovo, as noted in Section 3 
above, to include in the TOR for the next project a civic engagement component that 
will solicit proposals from civil society actors to engage citizens in the public governance 
process.  By funding the two most promising proposals the project will encourage 
meaningful local involvement in both designing and delivering interventions to engage 
citizens. 
To gain any traction for the kind of departure from traditional governance interventions 
these ideas represent, there has to be some lever to force the donors out of their 
current complacency.  I believe this will come as western donors see their influence 
slipping as the rapidly emerging economic powers (especially China, India and Brazil) 
increase use of their new wealth to gain economic and political influence amongst 
countries that traditionally benefit from western aid, at a time when western donors are 
curtailing their aid80.   In view of this new competition, The Economist newspaper 
suggests that the west should focus on its strengths in policy making and good 
governance (as opposed to infrastructure building).  If this is where we are to focus, we 
need a new approach to make it really count.
There is an ethical dimension to this approach to development assistance that needs to 
be considered.  Are the proposals to tailor solutions to local conditions or to involve 
possibly unsavoury informal actors a triumph of pragmatism over principle?  I would 
argue that they are not.  The underlying notion that non-negotiable principles have to 
be established as a prelude to future governance initiatives places principle at the core 
of these proposals.  I believe that the test of whether an approach is principled or 
pragmatic is whether the principles are adhered to even when it is inconvenient, i.e. 
when they hinder a negotiated settlement.  I envision a process whereby the 
significance of the principles is understood by all parties and where they establish the 
boundary within which the actors participate and local solutions are developed.  This 
approach can be considered a pragmatic path to successfully achieving the principles we 
                                                          
79 http://m.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/an-unlikely-path-to-aid-paying-to-set-up-think-
tanks/article624814/?service=mobile
80The Economist August 13 2011 Official Development Assistance, Aid 2.0
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hold dear; the current path towards these principles seems to lack a pragmatic basis and 
is therefore likely to fail.
I am hoping that attaining doctoral recognition for my work introducing PIFC in Kosovo 
will give me the credibility to champion a better approach to improving developing
country governance; an approach that adopts alternatives to traditional technical 
assistance-oriented governance projects, for the mutual benefit of donors and a more 
inclusive set of stakeholders.  I want to emphasize that I am not promoting the 
replacement of an old normative model with a new one; I would like to see the 
replacement of the idea of a singular normative solution with a process that would 
engage with developing country stakeholders to identify culturally-specific solutions 
that would be more likely to achieve strategic governance objectives.  Doing this could 
involve either a top-down or a bottom-up approach (or both).
Addressing this at the top would involve getting a place at the tables where donor 
policies are constructed and projects designed, to influence donors away from a 
prescriptive, one-size-fits-all approach to exporting best practices and towards an 
approach that involves a negotiated, situation-specific outcome.  Various institutions, 
such as the International Consortium for Government Financial Management, would 
provide fora to advocate for change indirectly, while working with donors like the EC 
and DfID, would be more direct.
A bottom-up path would involve working with consultants who have field responsibility 
for implementing change, to encourage a more nuanced, human-focused way of 
achieving donor goals that acknowledges local sensibilities.  This could be achieved 
through professional associations such as the Society for International Development or 
the Association of Management Consultants, or by developing an academic post-
graduate programme for professionals and other stakeholders that explores the issues 
from conceptual and practical perspectives.
In either case, the goal would be to encourage policy-makers and practitioners to 
challenge the way things are done and to be a catalyst for a more conscious process that 
results in effective, and more professionally satisfying, governance outcomes.  Engaging 
in this DProf and reflecting on the lessons learned from the public works cited 
encourages me to feel that I could contribute to this.
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ANNEX 1 LIST OF PUBLIC WORKS
List of Public Works to be read in conjunction with this Context Paper
Public Work #1: Strategy for the Internal Audit Function in the Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government in Kosovo
Public Work #2: Internal Audit Manual
Public Work #3: Administrative Instruction on Establishing Audit 
Committees
Public Work #4: Draft Strategic Development Plan for the Office of the 
Auditor General 
Public Work #5: Project Inception Report 
Public Work #6: PIFC Policy Paper
Public Work #7: Financial Management and Control Procedures Manual –
Risk Management
Public Work #8: Ministerial Handbook
Public Work #9: Change Management Paper
